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ABSTRACT
It Is estimated that alcohol plays a factor in between 35 and 64 
c'-rcent of all fatal crashes and between 6 and 25 percent for non-fatal 
accidents, resulting in alcohol .being involved in about half of the 
roughly 50,000 annual traffic fatalities in the United States. Clearly, 
drinking-and driving is a major contributor in both the severity and the 
frequency of traffic accidents.
The basic concept of deterrence states that people will refrain 
from behavior defined as socially-unaccc.ptable if the resulting 
perception and fear of penalties (or sanctions) against such action are 
adequately undesirable in comparison to the potential benefits of the 
behavior. Informal sanctions, those that are channeled through non- 
formalized media such as friends, family, or some other relevant 
collectivity, are oftentimes considered a much more effective deterrent 
for some offenses than are the formal sanctions imposed by the courts.
However, the dynamics of the informal sanction have impeded 
research into the individual perceptions and effects of such an elusive 
social control mechanism. It is hypothesized that the presence of 
certain personal and social characteristics may be related to the 
severity of informal sanctioning radiated from others toward that 
person.
This study applies this theoretical foundation to the offense of 
DUI. From November of 1987 through May of 1988, a questionnaire was 
administered to a group of 122 people convicted of DUI in Cass County, 
North Dakota. The offenders sampled were participants in the Cass 
County First Offender DUI Program, an educative/punitive program
viii
designed as an alternative to jail sentences foi- those deemed by a 
license addiction counselor to be free of any chemical dependency 
problem.
Upon constructing a scale comprised of 13 Likert-type items, the 
following findings were conferred: social status (income, education, 
occupation) showed no relationship with the offenders' perceptions of 
informal sanctioning, although the variables of occupational status and 
income did so moderately.
Gender proved to be the most discriminating factor in the perceived 
severity of informal sanctions, with females markedly more likely to be 
sanctioned informally than males. As an example of the influence of 
primary ties on informal sanctions, marital status was an insignificant 
factor, as was the presence of an example-setting role (indicated by 
whether or not the respondent shared his/her current residence with a 
family member under the age of 18). When combined with marital status, 
however, those respondents responding positively to the presence of a 
family member under 18 did score higher than both their single and 
married counterparts, although not significantly so.
As another example of primary ties, this time to the community, the 
length of residence and the size of the community were both found to be 
largely insignificant in the perceived severity of informal sanctions.
In the case of size of community of residence, those living within 
metropolitan areas (100,000+) did indicate the lowest perceived severity 
of informal sanctions related to their DUI than did any other category. 




STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Drinking-and-driving in the United States is far from a recent 
development. However, while the cultural presence of alcohol is a long- 
established predacessor to the automobile, modern motorized technology 
has recently placed a remarkable amount of individual power within the 
reach of the majority of adult Americans (Haddon and Blumenthal. forward 
in Ross 1984a, p. xiii).
Indeed, the existence of a "drinking-driving problem" in this 
country is the result of a procedure by which automobile fatalities have 
become a problem of societal concern, to be acted upon by public 
officials and agencies (Gusfield 1981, p. 3). Increasingly stringent 
auto safety standards, mandatory use of occupant restraints, and 
improvements in highway design have attributed to a continued decrease 
in traffic fatalities over the past 20 years. Nonetheless, although 
research disputes exactly how strong an influence alcohol plays in 
traffic accidents, the fact that it exacerbates the frequency and 
severity of accidents is less a matter of debate. Ross (1984a) 
estimates that alcohol typically plays a role in less than 10 percent of 
the run-of-the-mill automobile crashes, about 20 percent of the crashes 
resulting in serious injury, about 50 percent of all fatal crashes, and 
about 60 percent of all single-vehicle fatal crashes. Other research 
concurs, placing alcohol-involvement at between 35 and 64 percent in
1
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fatal crashes and between 6 and 25 percent for non-fatal accidents 
(Roizen 1982) . This results in alcohol being involved in about half of 
the roughly 50,000 annual traffic fatalities in the United States 
(Department of Transportation 1968; Jones 1977), making drunk driving a 
more common cause of death than international violence (Morris and 
Hawkins 1970).
According to estimates published annually by the National Safety 
Council (1987), 1985 data from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration National Accident Sampling System revealed alcohol as a 
factor i\i 8 percent of the property damage accidents and 27 percent of 
the serious injury accidents. This means that in 1986 alcohol was a 
factor in at least 21,000 fatal accidents, about 320,000 injury 
accidents, and about 1,300,000 property damage accidents (National 
Safety Council 1987, p. 52).
However, while the effects of such a relationship are widely 
accepted, some researchers have questioned the uniqueness of alcohol as 
a causal agent in traffic collision-involvement, focusing on 
multivariate rather than univariate explanations (Zylman 1972a; 1972b: 
Phillips, Ray, and Votey 1984). Clearly, the precise impact between the 
two is still unknown.
Wien examining specific age cohorts in relation to traffic 
fatalities, those between the ages of 15 and 24 are considerably 
overrepresented in motor-vehicle traffic fatality statistics. According 
to the National Safety Council (1987), drivers in this age group have 
the highest death rates of any age group, with about 40 deaths per 
100,000 population. The next highest traffic fatality cohort is that of 
drivers aged 75 and over, with slightly less than 30 deaths per 100,000
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population (National Safety Council 1987).
This latter estimate is imperative to the argument that alcohol is 
the primary factor affecting driver fatalities. Since it has been 
established that alcohol use is most highly represented in the younger 
age cohorts (Cosper and Mozersky 1968; Yoder and Moore 1973; Pelz, 
McDole, and Schuman 1975; Carlson 1973;), it might seem less than 
coincidental that this same age group also exhibits the highest death 
rate of any age cohort. However, this correlation loses it's viability 
when applied to the oldest age cohort. Perhaps the least represented 
with regard to alcohol consumption, the death rate remains overly 
escalated in comparison. Alternative explanations concerning the age- 
specific relationship between alcohol and traffic fatalities abound 
within the drug and social science literature (Tillman and Hobbs 1968; 
Carlson and Klein 1970; Klein 1968; Carroll, Carlson, McDole, and Smith 
1970). Thus, while alcohol is undoubtedly a relevant factor, it's 
precise impact upon driver injuries and fatalities is still unknown.
In addition to these human costs, monetary costs of drinking- 
and-driving (e.g., vehicle damage) have been estimated at $8-10 
billion annually (Cramton 1968). More current estimates place the 
annual cost of alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents at about $12 
billion (National Safety Council 1987). Many other less tangible 
impacts can also be attributed either directly or indirectly to drunk­
driving. such as social stigmatization, loss of status, and even 
potential loss of employment (Flygare 1983) .
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Public Sentiment
The perception of the drunk-driving offense has undergone a number 
of transitions, many of which have, occurred only within the past several 
years. A major transformation has been from a victimless crime to one 
which implies a moral failure of the individual offender (Ross 1984a). 
This is due in part to the public creation of what Gusfield (1981) calls 
"the myth of the killer drunk".
Other social 'transformations of drinking-and-driving are less 
recent and more cultural in nature. For instance, prior to the 
nineteenth century, drinking and drunkenness were seldom used to 
account for accidents or crime (Gusfield 1981). The emphasis in 
cartoons and fiction was less on the tragedy involved than on the 
supposed humor of such situations (Smith 1926), a view Ross (1984) 
maintains exists to some extent even today.
However, while all "socially responsible" parties will attest to 
the illegality of DUI (DUIA and DWI), criminologists and sociologists 
alike remain uncertain as to it's appropriate classification. For 
example, Ross (1960) identified DUI as a "folk crime", or one which 
shares similar characteristics with other deviant acts such as white- 
collar and welfare chiseling. As opposed to "ordinary criminals," folk 
criminals are relatively numerous, unstigmatized, and differentially 
treated in the legal process (Ross 1960, p. 237).
Similarly, Gibbons (1983, p. 213) characterized Ross's "folk crime" 
within the broader category of "mundane crime", a variety of 
commonplace, low visibility, and often innocuous forms of lawbreaking
5
found in abundance in American society.
However, the dramatic transformation regarding the severity of
Iformal' punishments for driving-while-impaired lead us to believe that 
such a shift represents an equally dramatic change in public sentiment. 
The current view of accidents as results of individual driver 
performance has become the dominant theme in the cultural organization 
of accident reality in the United States (Gusfield 1981. p. 41).
Gusfield (1981) further summarizes society's current focus on 
explaining impaired-driving on a micro rather than a macro level by his 
experience studying the San Diego court systems in the early 1970s:
".......... it was taken for granted by those 1 studied that
the problems of auto safety and alcohol were chiefly problems 
of individuals, of motorists. Institutional explanations and 
loci of responsibility were eloquently absent from the 
consciousness of officials, observers, offenders" (Gusfield 
1981, p. 7).
This focus on the individual also signaled a closely related change 
in public perception of the causal factors involved in what has now 
evolved into a full-fledged public problem, complete with a dominant 
aura of implied intentionality and moral failure. In his earlier work, 
Gusfield (1963) noted that the drunk as an offender was transformed from 
a repentant (or sick) deviant to that of an enemy. Thus, over the 
period of automobile use in the United States, emphases within the 
"unsafe driver" theory have shifted from careless but competent drivers 
to incompetent drivers to special categories of "accident-prone" drivers 
including the young, the very old, and the alcohol-impaired (Gusfield
.1981, p. 45).
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However, while researchers recognize a definite relationship 
between public sentiment and imposed legal sanctions, the direction of 
such a relationship is unclear. Common sense tells us that within a 
democratic government, the laws represent the will of the majority, a 
viewpoint Gusfield (1981) questions in regard to the drunk-driving 
problem in the United States.
Changing public sentiment is an essential component to evaluating 
the deterrent framework within which the issue of sanctions are most 
often dealt. For instance, Ross (1984a) attributes the recent deluge of 
deterrence-based DUI legislation as a direct result of the anti-drunk- 
driving movement, comprised of such organizations as MADD, SADD, REDDI, 
and RID. Other researchers argue that informal sanctions (e.g., 
negative public reactions, etc.) are an imperative prerequisite for 
effective legal sanctions (Gibbs 1975, p. 85; Jensen 1969; Salem and 
Bowers 1970; Tittle and Row 1974).
In any case, it is generally conceded that individual perceptions 
of sanction characteristics are probably more important than the actual 
characteristics of sanctions (Geerken and Gove 1975; Gibbs 1975; Teevan 
1972; Tittle and Logan 1973). After all, people can and do misperceive 
reality and it follows that they are likely to act on what they believe 
to be true regardless of whether it is actually true (Tittle 1980, 
p. 10). As stated by Waldo and Chiricos (1972):
’........ clearly, the deterrent effectiveness of punishment
presumes that potential offenders know or think they know whal 
the penalties are. Further, it must be assumed that offenders 
and non-offenders act on the basis of their knowledge (Waldo 
and Chiricos 1972, pp. 525-525, emphasis theirs).
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Tittle and Logan (1973) extend this viewpoint further, stating that 
the possibility exists that deterrence in general may be more a matter 
of belief than of reality. It is possible that the effectiveness of 
sanctions hinges on the perceived certainty of their imposition, a 
factor which may vary from individual to individual and from social 
group to social group (Tittle and Logan 1973, p. 380).
DUI as Deviant Behavior
Although many societal motives which are woven into complex 
sociological theories attempt to explain why certain behavior is deviant 
and who benefits from judging it as such, deviance defined is less 
ambiguous. Simply stated, the essense of deviance is behavior held in 
disrepute by most people in a given social context (Tittle 1980, p. 42).
However, Tittle (1980) goes on to argue that deviance is evaluated 
on the status of the behavior, not on its rarity or typicality. That 
is, if DUI is evaluated as deviant behavior by most people in a given 
social situation, it will continue to be classified as such even though 
most people in that same social context actually practice it (Tittle 
1980, p. 43).
A more appropriate and accepted method of defining deviance is in 
terms of social sanctions. Schur (1971) describes deviance as 
disapproved behavior about which something is done, while others argue 
that only those behaviors that evoke active reactions from a 
collectivity (or audience) of from formal agents of that collectively 
can be considered deviant (Tittle 1980, p. 44).
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From the review of the most recent information available, it 
appears impossible to confidently define the offense of DUI in terms of 
societal reactions on anything less than a regional basis. While 
stating that the collective sentiment toward DUI within the United 
States has undoubtedly harshened is a safe conclusion, the varying 
degrees to which this is the case is clearly more a regional phenomenon. 
To use the extended sample environment of North Dakota as an example, 
the public's perception of DUI appears to be largely the result of 
community and regional involvement rather than the direct result of any 
state or nationally-established mandates.
With the implementation of various opposition groups such as MADD, 
SADD, REDDI, etc., certain communities have initiated a state of public 
awareness within their respective environments. By the same token, 
however, a lack of organized community response - groups has resulted in a 
seemingly unaware if not apathetic approach to the DUI problem in some 
areas. Definition of the offense of DUI, it seems, is dependent largely 
upon well-organized community-based opposition.
Nonetheless, based upon considerable personal experience and 
involvement in the DUI issue at both the state and local level, it is 
this researcher's opinion that the attitude toward DUI within the 
immediate survey area is one of something more than simply a traffic 
offense. Personal implications, dissemination of legal sanctions, and 
feasible alternatives to driving after drinking are among the most 
pertinent messages communicated by public education programs, the mass 
media, and community workshops.
While other communities have managed similar attempts to sway the 
public perception of DUI away from that of a "folk crime" (see Ross
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1960), such efforts often fall short due to an inability to sustain 
furding, community involvement, or both. It appears that the 
responsibility of attributing to DUI the serious connotation it deserves 
lies in the hands of community leaders, progressive educators, and 
concerned citizens.
The Deterrence Model
Before progressing to the issue of offender perceptions of 
sanctions, the issue of deterrence must be addressed, for it is within 
this equation that the true effect of these perceptions is most 
essential. Simply stated, deterrence is the omission of an act as a 
response to the perceived risk and fear of punishment for contrary 
behavior (Gibbs 1975, p. 2 emphasis his).
Such a concept, although having established itself long before 
modern-day exchange theory, is perhaps the most obvious and commonplace 
example of weighing risk of sanction against outcomes of reward. Indeed, 
the fundamental premise of criminal justice is that people fear 
punishment and will obey the law if it provides a sufficient sanction 
threat (Tittle 1980, p. 1). As applied to traffic laws, Zimring and 
Hawkins (1973) maintain that in order for criminal law enforcement to be 
an effective deterrent for drunk-driving, a theoretical assumption is 
made that the individual motorist can be led to more diligent driving 
through fear of police apprehension and legal punishment.
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Current Legal Sanctions
The 1983 report of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving 
reported that during the previous year, thirty-nine states had enacted 
"improved" legislation. As quoted by Ross (1984a, p. 117),
"legislators, enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges around the 
country have responded to society's demands by enacting more effective 
legislation, apprehending more offenders, effectively prosecuting 
offenders, and meting out more appropriate sanctions."
In a related effort to combat the problem of youthful 
overrepresentation among the country's traffic fatalities, a Federal 
mandate threatening forfeiture of millions of dollars of state- 
targeted highway appropriations was implemented, resulting in virtually 
all fifty states have either raising or agreeing to maintain a legal 
minimum drinking age of twenty-one. In addition, jail sentences (in 
some cases even for first offenders), chemical evaluation, drivers 
license suspension, and minimum fine are among the most common mandatory 
legal sanctions enacted into law by many state legislatures.
In 1983, the 48th Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota 
enacted and amended sections of Title 39 of the North Dakota Century 
Code (NDCC) dealing with DUI, drivers license suspension/revoc.ation, 
implied consent, and sentencing (See Table 1). It should be noted that 
these mandatory sanctions applied only to DUI during their original 
conception, but were expanded to include the offense of actual physical 
control (APC) in 1988. Other major provisions should also be noted.
For those offenders 18 years of age or older who, because of drug
11
-impaired driving, cause the serious injury of another person, a minimum 
one-year incarceration for each death and ninety consecutive days for 
each injury is prescribed.
Table 1. Legal Sanctions for DUI in North Dakota 
FIRST TIME OFFENDER
1. A fine of at least $250 ($500 maximum)
2. A 90-day license suspension (maximum 30 days 
imprisonment)
3. A mandatory referral for an addiction facility for 
chemical dependency diagnosis
SECOND TIME OFFENDER (within five years)
1. A $500 fine
2. Four (4) days imprisonment or ten (10) days 
community service work (if imprisoned, then 48 
hours must be consecutively served) (30 days 
imprisonment maximum)
3. A license suspension of at least one (1) year
4. A mandatory referral to an addiction facility for
diagnosis and subsequent in-patient/out-patient treatment
THIRD TIME OFFENDER (within five years)
1. A $1,000 fine
2. Sixty (60) days imprisonment (maximum one (1) year 
imprisonment)
3. A license suspension of at least one (1) year
4. A mandatory referral to an addiction facility for diagnosis
and subsequent in-patient/out-patient treatment
FOURTH TIME OFFENDER (within seven years)
1. A $1,000 fine
2. One hundred and eighty (180) days imprisonment 
(maximum one (1) year imprisonment)
3. Driving privileges may be restored only after the offender 
has completed addiction treatment and has not committed any 
alcohol-related offenses of any kind for at least two (2) 
consecutive years following subsequent in-patient/out- 
patient treatment
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It is stressed that these legal sanctions are mandatory minimum 
requirements. That is, mimimum sanctions do not prevent a court from 
imposing the maximum sentence allowed by law. The mandatory minimum 
punishments were legally prescribed in part to elicit from the various 
courts some type of collective consistency in DUI sentencing. These 
minimum punishments, however, do not take away from the individual 
discretion of the preciding justice.
For instance, in DUI cases which involve "atypical" circumstances 
such as property damage, reckless disregard for human life, past 
criminal record, etc., the sentence may be imposed at it's fullest 
severity. In other more "typical" DUI offenses, the legally prescribed 
minimum may be applied. Unfortunately, the system falls short in it's 
quest for consistency due to a lack of organized court monitoring and a 
seemingly impotent ability to sanction judges who fail to sentence 
offenders with the legally prescribed minimum. In Grand Forks County 
Court in 1986, an elected county official was sentenced well-below the 
legal mandatox*y minimum punishment despite his second DUI conviction in 
less than five years. From various reports, sentencing discrepancies 
within North Dakota courts are not uncommon.
Empirical Research
£Jext to cancer, traffic-related fatalities are the most costly 
source of morbidity and mortality in modern societies. Despite the 
drunk drivers' apparent major role in causing them, up to now alcohol- 
impaired driving has been largely overlooked by sociologists, even those 
oriented toward social policy (Ross 1984b, pp. 23-24). Indeed, as Ross
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(1984b) also points out, because of the Individual and often 
atheoretical focus of drinking-and-driving studies, much of the 
literature remains relatively obscure and inaccessible.
A substantial portion of the existing research on sanctions 
maintains a focus on the deterrent effects of perceived sanction- 
fears on the self-reported incidence of deviant behavior (Salem and 
Bowers 1970; Tittle and Rowe 1973; Tittle and Logan 1973; Ross 1976;
Ross and Blumenthal 1974; Ross 1984b; Shover, Bankston, and Gurley 1977; 
Anderson, Chiricos, and Waldo 1977; Tittle 1969; Grasmick and Green 
1980; Schwartz and Orleans 1980; Tittle 1977; Cramton 1969). In the 
quest for identifying sanction-related factors which maximize 
deterrence, the end product is quite often an attempt to discern the 
strength or influence of such factors (i.e., certainty, severity, etc). 
Admittedly, from both a policy and a research standpoint, such a focus 
is indeed beneficial. However, there is a general lack of empirical 
concensus regarding the social mechanisms through which these factors 
effectively precipitate sanction fear; that is, why they do what they 
do.
As Cohen (1966) points out, most major theories of deviant behavior 
developed within the last century have given little attention to 
sanctions, choosing instead to emphasize motivations stemming from 
unusual normative contexts, failure of conventional socialization, 
psychodynamic problems, or pressure generated by social contexts. With 
few exceptions, sociologists have been preoccupied with the sources of 
deviant behavior rather than reactions to deviant behavior (Clark and
Gibbs 1965, p. 399, emphasis mine).
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With this in mind, Tittle and Logan in 1972 reviewed the literature 
and concluded that "enough suggestive evidence has been compiled to 
warrant systematic research efforts and to mandate serious theoretical 
consideration of the role of sanctions in human behavior and social 
organization" (Tittle and Logan 1973, p. 385). Since that time, it
I
appears research trends have in fact taken a narrower focus on the 
deterrent effects of formal and informal sanctions, addressing the 
impacts of specific sanctions on more typical acts of deviant behavior.
Need for this Research
Sanctions and the subsequent fear of sanctions comprise the 
integral premise of the central notion of compliance with norms, an 
essential prerequisite to the workings of a cohesive, coherent society. 
Ideally, they change in parallel with the dynamics of societal values, 
reflecting an informal public sentiment which is transformed into a 
formalized public policy. All too often, however, research has focused 
on only those issues defined by the majority as bonafide public 
problems. Because of this, little is known of drinking-and-driving 
prior to the 1970s.
Today, DUI has gained acceptance as'a problem warranting social 
concern. Researchers should take advantage of the public interest and 
potential benefits current attention could yield, through both 
innovative approaches as well as maintenance of historically established 
foci. In any case, the need to formulate and maintain the interest is 
essential to understanding and explaining the DUI phenomenon in the 
context of a changing culture.
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Another major downfall of the sanction-related research is the 
specific exclusion of DUI as deviant activity. As commonplace as 
drinking-and-driving is within the United States, DUI should be viewed 
as a unique violation in countless respects. For instance, it carries 
larger and more costly mandatory sanctions than does shoplifting, 
indicating that society collectively sees drunk-driving as more serious 
than stealing. However, DUI citations continue to be commonplace and 
relatively unstigmatized, indicating that being labeled a drunk-driver 
holds a less negative reaction in our culture than does being labeled a 
thief.
In her review of the literature, Vegega (1983, p. 2) concluded that 
very little information is available on attitudes about drinking-and - 
driving (i.e ., to what degree people consider DUI a problem, their 
willingness to work towards a solution, etc., emphasis hers).
Thus, the time to recognize drunk-dri\ring as a separate entry in 
the annals of deviant Dehavior is long overdue. As such, it should be 
afforded at least the same expenditure of resources and creativity as is 
delinquency, mental health, and numerous other norm violations of 
varying severity. The dynamics of society also demand that DUI be 
evaluated and classified in the context of modern subcultures as well as 
cultures. This study attempts to extend this reasoning.to the area of
DUI-related sanctions within specific environments.
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Summary of the Problem
As previously eluded to, drinking-and-driving is not new; what is 
new, however, it it's evolution from what C. Wright Mills (1959) called 
a "private matter" to a "public concern." Indeed, researchers and 
reformers now accept drunk-driving as problematic in our society. As 
Ross (1984a, p. 123) concludes, "I think we must accept the prognosis 
that no measures will eliminate drunk driving; the best we can do will 
be to reduce it."
Preview
The proceeding study attempts to distinguish the prevalence and 
severity of informal sanctioning (in this case negative informal 
sanctioning) of convicted DUI offenders based upon their individual 
perceptions. A scale comprising the various domains of informal 
sanctions has been constructed by which to plot the severity of informal 
sanctions across specified biographical lines.
Chapter Two will provide a comprehensive overview of relevant 
related empirical and theoretical research as it pertains to DUI, 
deviant behavior, and social sanctions. In addition, the theoretical 
framework of this study will be established, as will the dependent and 
independent variables to be utilized. Lastly, the specific hypotheses 
to be tested will be outlined.
Chapter Three provides a methodological overview of the study.
Basic characteristics of the sample, the sampling procedure, and issues
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of representativness and subsequent generalizability are addressed, as 
well as the potential downfalls of the sample and the respective data 
set. Also included within Chapter Three are the primary variables, 
their level and means of measurement, and preliminary statistical 
methods justifying creation of the variable transformations (i.e., 
informal sanctioning scale).
Chapter Four provides the statistical analyses and findings 
addressed in Chapter Three combined with the theoretical foundations 
contained within Chapter Two. Specific analytic procedures such as 
tests of significance, measures of association, and causal analysis are 
demonstrated and their respective findings shown. The results of each 
related analysis will be compared to the previously stated hypotheses as 
being either supportive, non-supportive, or inconclusive.
The final chapter, Chapter Five, contains the conclusion of the 
study. Comprised of the statistical findings in Chapter Four combined 
with the theoretical foundations outlined in Chapter Two, the concluding 
remarks summarize the potential benefits of the findings. In this case, 
a substantial portion of the conclusion will focus on potential policy 




Research on social sanctioning has historically maintained a 
preoccupation with the deterrent effects of various sanctions, with 
issues such as severity, celerity, and certainty of punishment among the 
most frequently scrutinized variables. Indeed, many such studies focus 
on the serious but statistically atypical criminal deviant acts such as 
murder, robbery, and.theft which occur within a society (Chiricos and 
Waldo 1970; Waldo and Chiricos 1972; Erickson, Gibbs, and Jensen 1977).
On the opposite end of the deviance spectrum, various other studies 
utilize this same deterrence theme using less serious offenses such as 
general traffic violations (Sigelman and Sigelman 1976; Middendorff 
1968; Shoham 1974; Shoham, Geva, Markowski, and Kaplinsky 1976). 
Similarly, other related research has concentrated on deviant drinking 
behavior (Nathan 1983; Larsen and Abu-Laban 1968) while still others • 
have chosen to address the deterrence issue with an emphasis on the 
social-psychological construct of risk perception (Claster 1967; Sinha 
1967).
Due in large part to the recognition of drinking-driving and DUI as 
a bonafide social problem, research incorporating deterrence with 
drinking-driving has only recently become a fertile topical area for 
researchers and policymakers (Ross 1984a; Gusfield 1981). Major studies 
linking the notion of deterrence to drinking-driving and DUI have been
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applied to national as well as international populations (Ross 1975; 
1976; 1977; 1984; Ennis 1977;).
The Deterrence Model
Based on the writings of classical thinkers and philosophers 
(Beccaria 1963; Bentham 1962), the.concept of deterrence states that the 
rate for a particular type of crime varies inversely with the celerity, 
certainty, and severity of punishments of that type of crime. Indeed, 
the fundamental premise of criminal justice is that people fear 
punishment and will obey the law if it provides a sufficient sanction 
threat (Tittle 1980, p. 1). Thus, according to Gibbs (1975), deterrence 
in it's most basic form is the omission of an act as a response to the 
perceived risk and fear of punishment for contrary behavior (emphasis 
his) .
Cooper (1973, p. 164) defines deterrence as "any measure designed 
actively to impede, discourage, or restrain the way in which another 
might think or act." Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 7) define deterrence 
as "principally a matter of the delcaration of some harm, loss, or pain 
that will follow noncompliance; in short, the central concept is that of 
threat."
However, Gibbs (1975, p. 2) makes a critical point in regard to 
both definitions: while the deterrence doctrine focuses specifically on 
crime and its related punishments, the term "punishment" is ambiguous in 
that it may refer to prescribed punishments (e.g., statutory penalties) 
or to actual punishments (emphases his). Hence, subsequently, when the 
term, is used without qualification, it refers to prescribed and/or
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actual punishments (Gibbs 1975, p. 3).
Because prescribed, legal punishments ere more easily measured and 
less dynamic than actual punishments given offenders, it serves as a 
more consistent and reliable construct of punishment than do the 
more peripheral informal punishments. However, exclusion of such actual 
punishments because of this hindrance threatens the validity of Gibb's 
(1975) definition of punishment.
Imperative to this analysis is the notion of specific deterrence 
put forth by criminologists and other social scientists. According to 
Gibbs (1975, p. 34), the deterrence doctrine is likely to be 
misunderstood and rejected unless critics recognize two categories of 
individuals: 1) those who have suffered a punishment for having
committed a crime and 2) those who have not. This distinction is of 
imperative relevance because the deterrence doctrine can be construed as 
asserting that individuals who have suffered a punishment for a type of 
crime are deterred from further offenses (Gibbs 1975, p. 34). This 
critical period of specific deterrence, therefore, commences after the 
punishment of someone in response to the criminal acts of the individual 
in question.
Sanctions Defined
Sanctions are defined as reactions by others that are unpleasant 
for the perpetrator of a deviant act regardless of whether those 
reactions are planned or whether they are intended to be unpleasant 
(Tittle 1980, p. 33). In his publication Sanctions and Social Deviance. 
Tittle (1980, p. 33) illustrates the relationship among the concepts of
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deviance, deterrence, and social sanctions: deterrence is a curtailment 
of deviance by sanctions.
Although they generally carry a punitive connotation, social 
sanctions are frequently differentiated as positive and negative 
sanctions. Positive sanctions constitute those positive 
reinforcements which reward one for conformist behavior while negative 
sanctions are those which penalize one for failing to comply to 
established norms. Applied to DUI, positive sanctions could take the 
form of reduced auto insurance rates for maintaining a good driving 
record while negative sanctions are more easily identifiable, such as 
loss of license or monetary fine. However, our legal system contains 
very few instances in which people are explicitly rewarded for 
comoliance, rather than punished for deviance (Schwartz and Orleans 
1967, p. 280).
Social learning theorists have long recognized the importance of 
sanctions as they apply to deterrence. In a modernized recapitulation 
of Sutherland's classic differential association theory of deviant 
behavior, Akers (1973) outlines the sanctioning aspects of reinforcement 
and punishment.
Reinforcement is the effect the reactions of others have upon the 
impending behavior of others. In less technical terms, sometimes our 
behavior is met by reactions from others (or has some other consequences 
attached to it) which influence us to do the same thing again under 
similar circumstances (Akers 1973, p. 49). Consequently, when the 
events following behavior have the effect of repressing or weakening it 
(technically decreasing the rate at which it is emitted), we say that 
punishment has occurred (Akers 1973, p. 50).
22
Akers's conception of the processes of social control closely 
parallels the related concepts of positive and negative social 
sanctions. Indeed, as he also distinguishes between positive and 
negative reinforcement and punishment, the similarities are evident. 
However, the origins of these control mechanisms are not of primary 
concern. Although Akers's social learning theory recognizes that 
reinforcements and punishments need not be tangible (fines, loss of 
license, etc.), little distinction is drawn between these and the more 
dynamic and elusive non-tangible punishments and reinforcements (i.e., 
loss of occupational status, loss of self-respect, etc.). For this 
reason, despite it's formidable application to sanctioning of the DUI 
offender, the basic premise of formal and informal sanctions are of 
greater benefit.
Theorists continue to disagree with regard to the content validity 
of informal sanctions as a methodological construct, or the extent to 
which empirical measurement reflects a specific domain of content 
(Carmines and Zeller 1979). Despite this discrepancy, a clear 
distinction between the two classifications is consistently made. 
Informal sanctions are those threatened or imposed by friends, 
relatives, or a personally relevant collectivity while formal sanctions 
are formalized penalties imposed by a court of law or by some routinized 
procedures (Tittle 1980, pp. 9-10). While other researchers (Schwartz 
and Orleans 1967) distinguish this latter category as legal sanctions, 
the definition is virtually identical.
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Relationships
Although the deterrence theme is central to the argument that 
various sanctions and their related characteristics impact the risk 
perception of various individuals differently, it is impossible to take 
all relevant variables into account to attribute the effect uniquely to 
sanctions (Tittle 1980). Similarly, the effectiveness of sanctioning 
practices are largely dependent upon individual perceptions, which may 
differ radically from individual to individual and social group to 
social group.
For this reason, while it may be equally beneficial to plot the 
specific deterrent effect of formal and informal sanctions over time 
following the punishment, the actual individual perceptions of the 
implementation of sanctions is of vital importance in the deterrence 
equation. Research has documented that sanction fear is translated 
through individual perceptions, which in turn are based largely in part 
on individual experiences and the experiences of significant others 
(Tittle 1980).
Empirical Research
Most major theories in deviant behavior developed in this century 
gave little attention to sanctions. Instead, they emphasized causes of 
deviance rather than society's response to deviance (Tittle 1980, p. 1; 
Clark and Gibbs 1965, p. 399).
"j
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Perhaps one of the most commonly addressed issues in criminology 
coday is whether or not those arrested accurately reflect the population 
of law violators in society (Hollinger 1984). Not surprisingly then, 
many researchers have taken an epidemiological approach by focusing on 
biographical characteristics of documented offenders in hopes of 
discerning those most at risk (Hollinger 1984; Borkenstein, Crowther, 
Shumate, Ziel, and Zylman 1969; Gurnack 1986; Cosper and Mozersky 1968; 
Vegega 1983; Carlson 1973; Yoder and Moore 1973; YToder 1975; Pelz, 
McDole, and Schuman 1975; Beck and Summons 1985; Zung 1984; Hurst 1973; 
Pandiani and McGrath 1986).
Perhaps the two major research areas of recent emphasis have dealt 
with determining the extent to which alcohol impacts traffic accidents 
and the extent to which certain biographical variables may explain the 
overrepresentation of certain social groups in the arrest statistics.
The former has been briefly touched upon in the preceeding chapter 
simply for illustrative puropses and thus will not be elaborated upon 
further. Empirical evidence concerning driver characteristics will be 
summarized in order to establish a foundation on which to base the 
upcoming analyses between many of these same biographical variables and 
driver perceptions of informal sanctions.
Driver Characteristics
Research has documented that various social groups and subgroups 
are consistently overrepresented in DUI statistics. For instance,
Zylman (1972b) found that found that drivers of lower social class were 
overrepresented in the high blood-alcohol content (BAC) and collision
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groups. Similarly, Hollinger (1984) found that lower ocupational status 
drivers showed up significantly more often than higher occupational 
status individuals in the arrested DUI population. Other studies have 
established a similar link using the construct of socioeconomic status 
(SES) (Yoder 1975; Hyman 1968; Borkenstein, Crowther. Shumate, Ziel, and 
Zylman 1969).
Pelz, McDole, and Schuman (1975) examined age on accident 
involvement in a sample of 1,670 young males and found the highest 
accident rates without alcohol involvement occurred in the 18-20 age 
group, while the most alcohol-related accidents occurred in the age 
range of 22-24 (empahsis mine). In a similar study, Carlson (1973) also 
found evidence to suggest that these over-involvements are consistent 
with the learning-to-drive and learning-to-drink-and-drive model of 
crash occurrence. Also with an emphasis on accident involvement, 
Borkenstein, Crowther, Shumate, Ziel, and Zylman (1969) found those 
classes with the worst accident experience to be (in addition to 
intoxicated) the young or very old, the inexperienced, and those with 
less formal education.
In a more stringent attempt to sketch a hypothetical profile of 
those most at risk, Mulford (1961) discerned from a quota sample of the 
Iowa population that drinking drivers were disproportionately male, aged 
20-40, disproportionately college educated, overrepresented in upper 
white-collar, skilled and unskilled occupations, and underrepresented in 
clerical, sales, semi-skilled and farming occupations. Gurnack (1986). 
in her sample of DUI offenders in two Wisconsin couni ics>, found that 





Relative to younger persons, older people tend to be less willing 
to take risks. Conversely, social status is also largely a function of 
age, with statuses and roles that are dependent upon favorable reactions 
of others (Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Sigelman and Sigelman (1976) 
found that younger people are less likely to succumb to the threat of 
sanctions in altering their behavior. Consequently, one would expect 
older people to be more sensitive to the threat of informal social 
sanctions.
Socioeconomic Status (SES)
The issue of socioeconomic status and it's relationship to sanction 
fear continues under debate. The social-psychological school of thought 
maintains that higher'status people should be more sensitive to 
sanctions than lower class people (Geerken and Gove 1975; Zimring and 
Hawkins 1973; Tittle 1969). Built upon the basic assumptions of 
exchange theory, Zimring and Hawkins (1973) also contend that higher 
status people simply have more to lose if caught. Homans (1961), 
however, argues that middle status persons are ‘lie most sensitive to 
sanctions because they have something to lose, but lack sufficient- 
status to risk anything.
Conventional Ties /Mar i tal .Status
In his theoretical work in the areas of delinquency and other 
deviant behavior, Hirschi (1969) argues that those who maintain
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conventional ties to society are more sensitive to sanction threats 
simply because they have more to lose by negative sanctions.
Thus, one could hypothesize that those most involved in social 
relationships will be more constrained and subsequently be more prone to 
perceiving informal sanctioning as severe. Those who are single, since 
they are exposed to fewer social bonds (in terms of marital status) 
should be less sensitive to informal sanctioning than those married 
offenders. Assuming this, the separated/divorced and widowed should 
fall between these two extremes (Tittle 1980, pp. 123-124). Similarly, 
the presence of a role of "example setter" should also prove to be a 
substantial force in the establishment of conventional ties. One might 
then expect the obligation of adolescent and pre/adolescent 
socialization to be a factor in the perception of the severity of 
informal social sanctions.
Conventi onal Ties/Social Integration
Some social theorists (Geerken and Gove 1975) maintain that more 
informal communication patterns enable smaller, more cohesive 
communities to radiate more of a deterrent effect. Since formal 
sanctions are largely held constant, the only feasible variation would 
appear to be that of informal sanctioning. Thus, those offenders 
maintaining these more conventional ties with their surrounding 
environment may be subject to more severe social sanctioning simply by 
virtue of the size of the community.
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Community Cohesion/Geographic Mobi1itv
People who change residences often should be less constrained by 
the possibility of negative reactions from others (informal sanctions) 
because they are less dependent upon a given reference group for 
positive response (Tittle 1980, p. 21). If this theory holds firm, one 
would expect that those more firmly integrated into a society will 
perceive the severity of informal sanctions to be greater than those who 
do not yet occupy a legitimate, functioning part of the status network.
Hypotheses
As previously stated, most recent research on sanctions has either 
not focused on DUI. has failed to methodologically incorporate an 
acceptable distinction between formal and informal sanctions, or has 
not theoretically extended the statistical correlations between 
sanctions and certain offender characteristics.
This being the case, the nature of this study is largely 
exploratory. However, several hypotheses can be explored: 1) persons 
of higher social status will tend to perceive informal sanctions as more 
severe than will those of lesser social status; 2) females will tend to 
perceive informal sanctions as more severe than males; 3) persons with 
socially-defined behavior-setting roles (i.e., parents, brothers, 
sisters, managerial persons, etc.) will perceive informal sanctions as 
more severe than will those under no such social obligations; A) people 
maintaining close primary ties (i.e., marriage) will perceive informal 
sanctions as more severe than those not married (single, divorced, 
separated, widowed); 5) persons indicating longer present residences
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will perceive informal sanctions as 
smaller, more personal environments 
informal sanctions as more severe.
more severe;, and 6) persons from 
(rural vs. metro) will perceive
Chapter III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
This study is based on data collected from convicted DUI offenders 
in Cass County, North Dakota. Utilizing an epidemiological approach, 
the purpose of this study is to examine the relationships of perception 
of informal sanctioning of individual offenders based upon the 
biographical characteristics of gender, occupation, education, income, 
community cohesion (length of residence), and primary ties (marriage, 
family),
Dot a Co.llc..Ct-i,on
The data for this study was collected from convicted violators of 
alcohol-related driving offenses required to participate in the Cass 
County First Offender DUI Program. Held on an "on demand” basis, this 
72-hour punitive/educative program is designed as a supplement to the 
mandatory minimum punishment prescribed by law.
To ensure maximum compliance in regard to questionnaire completion 
the instrument was cooperatively designed with program staff and 
subsequently adopted as an official portion of their program curriculum 
Thus, while participation was not mandatory to successful completion of: 
the program, it may have been assumed as such by some participants. 
Nonetheless, the option of refusal was available and exercised by a
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number of participants. All respondents were guaranteed absolute 
anonymity and encouraged to be honest in their responses. The 
average class size contained about fifteen participants.
Using a 6 -page questionnaire designed, pre-tested, and re-designed 
specifically fcr this study and sample population, one hundred twenty 
two program participants were surveyed in eight sessions from September, 
1987 through May. 1988. Of these, eighteen respondents refused to 
participate in the study, another ten wore participating for offense(s) 
other than DUI, and two gave no response. Thus, an overall response 
rate of 85.2 percent was obtained, although the final usable sample size 
consisted of 96.
'The questionnaire consisted of four basic sections: 1) a series of 
Likerl - scaled attitudinal items reflecting the respondents' viewpoints 
on DUI in general; 2) a similar series of Likert-scaled attitudinal 
items designed to measure responsents' perceptions of informal 
sanctioning related to their individual DUI; 3) a series of items 
recording basic biographical characteristics; and A) a series of scaled 
and open-ended items reflecting respondent's past drinking-driving 
behavior and the identification of significant others in regard to 
informal sanctioning.
The first section was provided as a gauge to reflect respondent's 
attitudes toward DUI, and was included primarily as a data-gathering 
source to be used as an educational tool by pi'ogram counselors in future 
classes. It consisted of twenty-seven items rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale which ranged in content from respondent viewpoints regarding DUI 
apprehension, legal treatment of DUI, and perception of DUI offenders in 
general. Statements reflecting these areas were given, and respondents
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were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with 
each. * The response categories ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly 
disagree", with the middle category being neutral.
The second group consisted of twenty-six items based upon a similar 
5-point Likert scale which asked for respondents' views on their own 
individual DUI. From these, a 13-item scale measuring the construct of 
informal sanctioning was constructed. Items regarding the perceived 
feelings and actions of various significant others toward their DUI 
offense were formulated in statements which again asked respondents to 
indicate their level of agreement or disagreement. As before, 
respondents were given a choice of five possible responses: 1) strongly 
agree; 2) agree; 3) neutral; 4) disagree; and 5) strongly disagree.
Sample Population
The working sample size consisted of ninety-six respondents 
convicted of DUI, indicating they were tested and found to be legally 
impaired at the time of their apprehension (BAC .10 or abo\">). This was 
the primary criterion for inclusion. Seven respondents were also cited 
for one additional alcohol-related traffic-offense such as minor 
possession or open container, with another seven indicating having been 
cited for at least two similar offenses. Table 2 indicates respondents’ 
reported offense cross-tabulated by gender.
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'able 2






Males 77 6 1 0 3 87
Females 14 0 0 0 0 14
Total 91 6 1 0 3 101
Frequency missing = 3
Participants ranged in age from 17 to 73 with the majority
clustered in the 20- 24 y^ar •old age group. The mean age for the entire
population was 29.10 years, with males and females averaging 29.03 and
29.77 years. respect ively. Table 3 is a cross - tabulation of age - ranges
by gender.
Table 3
Are of Respondents by Gender
<20 21-23 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+ Total
Males 17 28 8 14 5 3 7 0 1 83
Females 2 1 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 14
Total 19 29 12 18 6 4 7 0 1 97
Frequency missing —
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As the primary means of determining blood alcohol levels (BAC) of 
suspected impaired drivers, blood samples are taken at a local hospital 
and sent to the North Dakota State Toxicology Department located on the 
North Dakota State University campus. For the entire population, the 
average BAC was .1701, with males averaging .1673 and females averaging 
.1883. It should be noted, however, that because 12 of the male 
participants were not cited for DUI, their BAC levels were most probably 
less than the legally prescribed minimum of to. Table 4 shows the 
cross - tabulation of BAC levels by gender.
Table 4
Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) by Gender
.05- .10 .11- .15 .16-.20 .21-.25 .25+ Total
Males 4 28 31 15 1 79
Females 0 3 5 a 0 12
Total 4 31 36 19 1 91
Frequency missing - 13
Methods of Analysis
With a series of attitudinal items, respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement/disagreement .with statement'.- Identifying the 
severity of various informally-enforced sanctions following their 
conviction for DUI. Items depicting various informal channels such as 
family, colleagues, and friends were used to represent the construct of 
informal sanctions. A similar construct was initially proposed to
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represent respondents' perceptions of formal sanctions; however, after 
considerable theoretical contemplation, such an effort was discouraged. 
Since formal sanctions are most often associated directly with legal 
sanctions (i.e., fines, loss of license, etc.), it was decided that 
severity of perceptions regarding these would be little more than a 
function of access to available resources (i.e., money, legal counsel, 
etc.).
As a preliminary tool designed to filter out and group together 
existing underlying relationships, an exploratory factor analysis 
technique was utilized on the 26 items dealing with sanctions. This 
technique maintains a common objective of representing a set of 
variables in terms of a smaller number of hypothetical variables (i.e., 
informal sanctions). In an exploratory application as used here, factor 
analysis is an expedient way of ascertaining the minimum number of 
hypothetical factors that can account for the observed covariation, and 
as a means of exploring the data for possible data reduction (Kim and 
Mueller 1986. p. 9).
After applying this technique to the 26 items dealing with 
individual sanctioning, a-scale was constructed utilizing 13 of these 
items. SPSS-X (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used 
for all analyses. Cronbach's alpha was used a measure of reliability.
The independent variable of social status was constructed using 
modification of Tittle's (1980) larger five-category additive index of 
status. Unskilled workers such as laborers were coded as one (1), 
skilled laborers such as welders were assigned a two (2), and 
professional/managerial persons were assigned a three (3).
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The 12-item income scale was developed using similar values, 
beginning with a one (1) for the $0-$4,999 category and continuing 
upward to the $50,000 or above category, which was assigned an eleven 
(11). Lastly, the variable of education was accordingly given similar 
values, ranging from a one (1) for having completed grades 1-8 and a 
five (5) for a college graduate or higher. From the consequent 
summation of these three variables, a scale ranging from 3-19 was 
constructed utilizing the three social status indicators of occupation, 
income, and education.
Hcfwever, it should be cautioned that each respective status 
represents a combination of three characteristics. Thus, a low 
education could be more than offset by a larger than expected income 
(i.e., skilled laborers). Likewise, a larger educational value (5) 
could be offset by a smaller income than expected (i.e., university 
professors). As a precautionary measure to avoid any unusual 
distributions, these scale items formulated to represent social status 
were also analyzed separately to account for individual impacts.
Da ta Limitations
Obviously, no data collection technique is without limitations.
A number of obvious limitations are evident within this data set, 
many of which are simply functions of survey research techniques and the 
sensitive nature of the research. While self-reported data has long 
been criticized as inaccurate or insufficient, most criticisms addressed 
are simply unavoidable under the circumstances and accepted for lack of 
a better technique.
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Particularly when dealing with socially sensitive topical areas 
such as deviant behavior, respondents are often compelled to 
inaccurately report past behavior or present attitudes despite 
guaranteed anonymity. Undoubtedly, some socially-desirable response 
bias was involved. Also, when respondents were asked items concerning 
informal sanctions, it can be assumed that some respondents are simply 
not as perceptive to these forces as others, regardless of whether or 
not they (informal sanctions) indeed exist.
Another potential barrier to honest, uncontaminated responses is 
the fact that completion of the questionnaire was most likely viewed as 
a mandatory part of the program. While it was adopted by the program 
staff as an official portion of the program, mandatory completion of the 
instrument was not stressed. Nevertheless, this implied consent may 
have compelled some respondents to indicate either socialy desirable 
answers or to simply complete the questionnaire as quickly as possible 
with little regard to question content.
Certainly, another issue is one of generalizability, or predicitive
validity. That is, whether or not the 104 respondents surveyed during
*
the Cass County First Offender Programs constitute a representative 
cross-sanple of DUI offenders. Obviously, as the program's name 
implies, the more extreme cases of DUI such as multiple offenders would 
most likely be channeled to either inpatient or outpatient chemical 
dependency treatment. Those offenders exhibiting extremely high BAC 
levels at the time of arrest are also likley to follow a similar fate, 
drastically underestimating the average BAC level of those within the 
sample.
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Another potential biasing agent is one of police apprehension. One 
can assume those arrested for DUI constitute a random cross-sample who 
were simply unfortunate enough to be caught and arrested. Only if this 
assumption is correct can one further assume that this program cross - 
sample is similarly representative, that their attendance in the program 
is not the result of some underlying bias. This issue, while 
unexplored, is nevertheless a viable concern.
Going a step further, those convicted of DUI may be filtered out by 
means other than a police apprehension bias. For instance, DUI has 
proven to be such a "dependable" and consistent violation that 
specialized legal counsel now exists which does little more than defend 
DUI* cases. Lawyers who specialize in beating DUIs in court attest to 
the perceived social seriousness of the offense. Not surprisingly, 
then, those with greatest access to the necessary resources (^.e., 
money, etc.) are most able to resort to legal means to avoid a DUI 
conviction. The distribution is thus greatly skewed away from higher 
income violators, a phenomenon characteristic of other criminal 
violations as well.
Lastly, a certain number of questionnaires (about 24 percent) were 
either not completed, contained numerous uncompleted items, or were 
completed by respondents participating in the program for violation(s) 
other than DUI. .Because of this relatively small sample, the decision 
was made to include respondents' informal sanction scale score if 11 of 
the.13 items (85 percent) were completed. Missing scores were replaced 
by means scores tabulated from a summation of existing responses. It 
was felt this would be a more accurate representation of the sample; 
population than would excluding them by a listwise deletion process.
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Dependent Variable
Individual perceptions of informal sanctions is the dependent 
variable of this study. In developing this construct, it was attempted 
to adequately represent all primary domains of what constitutes informal 
sanctioning. Encompassing a considerably more dynamic and individual 
nature than formalized santions, items reflecting the reactions of 
various significant others such as family, co-workers, and friends were 
utilized.. However, it should again be noted that recognition of 
informal sanctioning depends largely upon the perceptiveness of the 
respondent. That is, simply because a subject is unaware of the 
sanction does not necessarily imply that none exists.
In an attempt to uncover the underlying structure of correlation, 
factor analysis was performed as a means of partitioning out unrelated 
data. A principal components extraction technique with a varimax 
rotation was used, with a .40 factor loading established as a minimum 
criterion for item inclusion into the respective factors.
When all items dealing with individual reactions to DUI (Z1-Z26) 
were incorporated into a factor analysis technique, 10 factors were 
extracted. In a confirmatory mode, however, the factor analysis 
technique extracted four factors when applied only to certain scale 
items.
Factor one represents a 'collection of informally-enforced 
sanctioning items concerning their severity in relation to formal 
sanctions. The 5 items (see Appendix A) which compx'ise this first
factor are: Z6, Z12, Z13, Z19, and Z22. For identification of these
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particular items, please refer to Appendix A.
The second factor represents similar informally-enforced 
sanctioning items reflecting a negative perception of the offender by 
the public in general. Included in this factor are items: Z14, Z18, 
and Z24 (see Appendix A).
Factor three represents informally-enforced sanctions which reflect 
a negative perception within the offender's work environment. Included 
in this factor are items: Z10, Zll, and Z24.
The final factor represents family-oriented informal sanctions.
This factor is comprised of items: Zl, Z6, and Z16. It should be 
noted, however, that while a general rule of thumb concerning factor 
analysis is to use only those factors which exhibit significant loadings 
on at least three variables, a similar rule states that, reglardless of 
the number of significant variables only those factors which can be 
reasonably interpreted should be utilized.
Factor Analysis Interpretation
While this research has attempted to identify the underlying 
factors, the factorial complexity of the final two variables must be 
addressed. The factorial complexity refers to the number of factors 
having (significant) loadings on a given variable (Kim and Mueller 1986, 
p. 24). In this case, only variables within the first two factors load 
on a single common factor, giving them a factorial complexity of one.
The third factor loads upon two unique variables (Z10 and Zll), but also 
on Z24. Likewise, factor four exhibits similar loadings on Zl and Z16 
while sharing a significant loading with Z6. In each case, the
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secondary factor loading is lower than it's initial loading.
In some instances, the lower of the two (or multiple) factor 
loadings are simply dropped from the analysis. With the last two 
factors maintaining the methodologically prescribed minimum of variables 
comprising the factor, such an exclusion would most certainly prove 
detrimental to complete representation of the construct of informal 
sanctions. On the other hand, the consistency with which the variables 
group within the last three factors should be more closely examined.
Within factor two, the three items identified concern the 
embarassment of getting caught, the fear of having one's name appear in 
the local newspaper, and the fear of being labeled an alcoholic. In 
each case, the item reflects the offender's fear of negative public 
reaction. These three items, while being exclusive to factor two, also 
appear to have the common denominator of fear of public exposure.
Factor three is less concrete. The first two items concern the 
offenders' relationships at work and his/her obligation to setting a 
good example at home/work. These have been interpreted to be one of the 
established primary ties which channel informal sanctions to the 
offender (co-workers, colleagues, etc). As much as they represent a 
certain primary tie, however, they also represent a certain reaction by 
the offender concerning that social tie: that of a perceived loss of 
status among previously-established subordinates in work and/or 
family settings. Looking to the third item which loads significantly on 
factor three sheds light on this interpretation. Item Z24 deals with 
the perception of people labeling the offender a drunk or an alcoholic. 
Since the origin of the effect is unspecified, it must be assumed that 
this item relies upon the perceived loss of status among significant
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others in general. With this item interpreted as such, the third factor 
seems adequately interpretable.
Factor four is similar in nature. While the first two items which 
load significantly are related in nature, the third item is of a more 
generic (but explainable) content. Items Z1 and Z16 entail the 
perceived reaction of the offender's family with regard to his/her DUI. 
Item Z6 simply states the perceived reaction of "others" to the 
individual's offense. If this designation of "others" can be assumed to 
encompass the foremost primary tie of the family, then factor four can 
also be utilized as being interpretable.
Although the possibility of collapsing the informal sanctioning 
scale into groups of equal intervals was contemplated, an examination of 
the distribution of the data revealed a strong clustering effect near 
the midway point, with those numbers falling off drastically at the 
upper extreme of the scale. At the risk of deleting those few scores 
which occupy.the high end of the scaling distribution, the decision was 
made to retain the scale scores as continuous interval-level variables.
Independent Variables
Social Status
The construct of social status is one of the primary independent 
variables in this study. Using Tittle's (1'280) construct of social 
status, the variables of occupation, education, and income were 
incorporated into a single variable. While each of these three 
variables were combined as unweighted measures, analysis was also 
conducted using each individual variable in it's original state.
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Occupation
The variable of occupation initially consisted of assigning an 
individual code to every discernible occupation listed. For the purpose 
of data reduction and clarification, the occupations were collapsed into 
three distinct categories: 1) unskilled labor, which consists of 
occupations requiring no formalized training; 2) skilled labor, which 
consists of occupations requiring some formalized training, 
apprenticeship, or completion of a degree; and 3)
professional/managerial, which consists of upper-level occupations such 
as supervisor, foreman, or owner. The duties prescribed within this 
latter category involve the direct supervision of subordinates.
Income
Income is defined within an 11-level Likert scale beginning at $0- 
$4,999 and increasing in approximately $5,000 intervals (see Appendix 
A). It should be noted that this is net income, or the total spendable 
income available after taxes. Income is collapsed into the five 
categories of: 1) $0-14,999; 2) $15-24,999 3) $25-$34,999 4) $35-
$44,999 and 5) $45,000 and over. Mean breakdowns and cross­
tabulations are performed using these categorical designations, with the 
original variable coded from 1 to 11 used in the summated scale of 
social status.
Education
Education, is a 5-level Likert scale beginning with completion of 
grade 1 through 8 and ending with college graduate or more (see Appendix 
A). Cross - tabulation and mean breakdowns are utilized to plot any
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observable trends, with education also used to formulate the variable of 
social status.
Gender
The gender of the respondent is a nominally-measured variable coded 
simply 1 for males and 2 for females (see Appendix A). Because of it's 
nominal nature, regression analysis utilizing dummy or effect coding is 
the only alternative to incorporating this variable into a regression 
equation.. A more appropriate technique would simply be a difference of 
means test across sexes.
Length of Residence
Length of residence in a community is utilized as a measure of 
primary ties to the community. Initially, respondents were asked to 
indicate how long they had lived within their current community of 
residence (see Appendix A). To aid in the analysis, this variable was 
computed into total months rather than years, due to the fact that not 
all respondents had lived at their current address longer than one year. 
Length of residency was also collapsed into the categories of: 1) less 
than 12 months; 2) 12-60 months; 3) 61-120 months; 4) 121-240 months; 
5) 241-360 months: 6) 361-480 months; and 7) 481-600 months. No 
respondent reported living within their current community for longer 
than 50 years (600 months).
Marital Status
Marital status was reported as: 1) single, never married; 2) 
married 3) divorced; 4) seperated; or 5) widowed (see Appendix A).
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Since measurement of this variable is restricted to an ordinal level, it 
will be used as an independent criterion to breakdown informal 
sanctioning scale scores.
Size of Current Community of Residence
Using a six-tiered designation of community size beginning with 
farm and progressing through metropolitan (100.000+), respondent's 
community of residence size will undergo an univariate analysis similar 
to the previous ordianally-measured variables (see Appendix A).
Preview of Findings
With the review and description of the previous variables to be 
utilized in the analysis, the following chapter will summarize the 
findings as they relate to the previously specified hypotheses. The 
final chapter will relate the future impacts of these findings upon 
related research as well as potential policy implications.
Chapter IV
FINDINGS
The construct of perceived severity of informal sanctions was 
created as the dependent variable of this study. Comprised of 13 
Likert-type items which asked convicted DUI offenders how they perceived 
reactions of others toward them, a scale was developed which 
.approximates this construct.
Having selected items thought to be representative of a shared 
construct (informal sanctioning), a confirmatory factor analysis was run 
which yielded four factors identified as 1) informal versus formal 
sanctions: 2) informal sanctions transmitted via the public; 3)
informal sanctions transmitted via co-workers/colleagucs; and 4) 
informal sanctions channeled via respondent's immediate family.
To test these 13 items as they contribut to the overall reliability 
of the scale, Cronbach’s alpha was used.^ Using the reliability 
function of SPSS-X (SPSS 1986), an alpha of ,81.23 was obtained (See 
Appendix B). Although it is difficult to specify what level is 
acceptable in all situations, it is believed that reliabilities should 
not be below .80 for widely used scales (Carmines and Zeller 1987, p.
51). In addition, in most situations, alpha provides a conservative
1 Defined as a measure of internal consistency, Cronbach's alpha is 
calculated using the mean interitem correlation divided by the number of 
scale items (Carmines and Zeller 1979, p. 44).
estimate of a measure's reliability (Carmines and Zeller 1987, p. 45).
It would seem, therefore, that the reliability of this newly-constructed
scale is such that each of the 13 items appear to be consistently
measuring the same construct.
,  •
As an exploratory technique for observing the strength and 
diversity of the relationships among the variables of interest, a 
Pearson's R measure of association was performed using the Pearson 
correlation command of SPSS-X.^ This statistic is useful in both an 
exploratory and confirmatory mode of data analysis, although the 
correlation coefficients are themselves devoid of any causal 
interpretations.
For binomial variables, the T-test procedure was used as a 
difference of means test for scale scores.J In cases where variables 
under scrutinization consisted of more than two groups, the oneway 
procedure was used as a difference of means test for multiple groups/4 
The Scheffe's Test statistic utilizing an alpha of .10 was prescribed to 
aid in the comparison of significance levels among several groups.-3
2 The Pearson correlation command of SPSS-X produces matrices of 
Pearson product-moment correlations with significance levels and number 
of cases (SPSS 1986, p. 639).
J The T-test procedure compares the sample means (informal sanction 
scale scores) by calculating Student's t and the test of significance of 
the difference between means (SPSS 1986, p. 443).
 ̂ The oneway procedure produces a oneway analysis of variance for 
an interval level variable (informal sanction scale scores) by one 
independent variable (SPSS 1986, p. ’465).
J Although social scientists conventionally set alpha at .05 or, 
somewhat less frequently, .10 or .01, the researcher has th< 
responsibility of selecting an alpha level that seems most ; • asonable in 
terms of the goals of the research project (Healey 1984, p. 143).
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Due to the exploratory nature and the virtual unestablishment of the 
independent construct (informal sanctions) within the discipline, an 
alpha of .10 was prescribed.
A multiple regression technique was considered as a means of 
transforming previously established statistical relationships into a 
theoretically-driven causal model. In such a model, the attempt would 
be made to determine how induced variations in the independent variable 
lead to variations in the dependent variable (perceived severity of 
informal sanctions). Stated differently, the goal is to determine how, 
and to what extent, does variability in the dependent variable depend 
upon manipulations of the independent variable (Pedhazur 1982, p. 15).
However, the decision was made to avoid a regression analysis based 
on several statistical and theoretical considerations. First and 
foremost, the levels of measurement of the relevant independent 
variables (nominal and ordinal) do not justly suit • •t'selves to a 
regression analysis. Admittedly, whi1> the treat of ordinal-level
variables as interval within regression analyses i not uncommon, 
subsequent interpretation of the beta coefficients is characterized as 
cautious at best. Additionally, although the binomial variable of 
gender would lend itself to a regression analysis via dummy or effect 
coding, such an analysis would yield little more than a difference of 
means test.
Scjondly, despite the a priori statement of hypotheses, the nature 
of this study is more exploratory than confirmatory. The primary 
relevance of this study will be the future hypotheses-generating effects 
of the findings. As such, the relationships between the variables 
predicted in Chapter Two are of more a correlational than a causal
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order. Any interaction effects or causal modeling should be undertaken 
:.n similar studies of greater scope, implementing a more defined measure 
of informal sanctions as well as more intricate measurement techniques.
Thirdly, and perhaps secondarily, the usage of exploratory 
techniques during the preliminary analysis stage indicated little 
justification to continuing on to more intricate statistical methods.
Had the correlations and the difference of means tests indicated highly 
significant findings, progression to a causal technique would probably 
have been warranted. Based on these preliminary findings, however, it 
was determined that no need for multivariate analysis existed.
Sfig-Xal S.v.v«m5. Rgia.Uoj»s.Uijf
The previously stated hypothesis concerning social status and 
informal sanctions suggests that persons of higher social status will 
tend to perceive informally-enforced sanctions as more severe than will 
persons of lower statuses. Using a derivation of Tittle's (1980) 
construct of social status, the variables of education, income, and 
occupation were formulated to comprise an additive summarization of 
status. For this transformation, the variable of occupation was first 
collapsed into the three categories of: 1) unskilled labor; 2) skilled 
labor; and 3) professional/managerial.
The social status variable encompassed a possible range of scores 
from 3 to 19. A frequency distribution of the actual scores showed a 
normal distribution with a range from 3 to 16, with the higher values 
representing a higher social status. To render the data in a usable 
form to perform a oneway analysis of variance, social status was
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collapsed into three categories: 1) Low social status = values from 3 
to 6 (N=27); 2) Medium social status — values from 7 to 10 (N=50); and
3) High social status = values from 11 to 16 (N=24).
Preliminary analysis using the Pearson's R correlation coefficient 
indicates a virtually non-existant relationship (R = -.0004, P — .498) 
between the three constructed status groups and each respondent's scale 
score measuring perceived severity of informal sanctions.
Interestingly, the correlation of respondent's social status as a 
contiguous variable (prior to formation of the three groups) is somewhat 
stronger, although still highly non-significant (R -> - .0643, P «• .261).
The oneway procedure comparing the mean values of informal sanction 
scale scores across social status groups (See Table 5) yielded an 
equally non-significant finding (F — .6192, P « .5405), which confirms 
the apparent accuracy of the slight correlation. The breakdown of mean 
scale scores by social status group yielded a total variance range of 
less than 1.8.
Table 5
Onewav Analysis of Variance of Social Status and 












Between 2 70.0984 35.0492 .6192 .5405




A primary concern indicated earlier was the threat to validity the 
unweighted measures of income, education, and occupation might 
potentially pose. That is, how a disproportionately high education 
level combined with a high occupational status might be cancelled out by 
a lower than expected income (i.e., university professors). Because the 
construct of social status is in and of itself highly dynamic and 
contested, "appropriate" weightings would likely be a matter of debate 
has they in fact been applied to adjust the respective variable values. 
At any rate, despite their undisputed statistical insignificance as a 
collective construct, the individual variables comprising social status 
may constitute formidable factors in identifying the variance of scale 
scores.
Income
Along with occupation and education, the variable of income was 
incorporated into the construct of social status. The Pearson's R 
correlation coefficient, however, indicates not only an insignificant 
relationship between respondents' income levels and perception of 
informal sanctions (R = -.0702, P — .252), but a negative relationship 
as well.
Initially, the income variable was coded from 1 to 11, with each 
category ascending in approximatley $5,000 increments. Because persons 
in the upper-level income brackets are largely underrepresented in the 
DUI statistics, income was collapsed into four groups to partially
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alleviate the small numbers which would occupy these higher income 
categories. The four groups consist of: 1) $14,999 and less (N = 44); 
2) $15,000-29,999 (N - 33); 3) $30,000-39,999 (N - 11); and 4) $40,000 
and greater (N = 5).
As illustrated by Table 6, the oneway analysis of variance 
indicates a statistically insignificant finding (F = 2.13, P .1019), 
although barely so. While this ratio is insignificant at a confidence 
level prescribed by most in the social sciences (.05), such a finding 
should be sufficient to warrant future exploration into the 
relationship. This researcher cautiously interprets the strength of 
this relationship to be one of moderate intensity at a conservatively 
acceptable confidence level. Nonetheless, the primary crux of this 
finding should be the realization that enough of a relationship appears 
to exist to warrant further exploration into the phenomenon.
Table 6
Onewav Analvsis of Variance of Income and










Between 3 311.5940 103.8647 2.1311 .1019
Within 89 4337.6318 48.7374
Total 92 4649.2258
Occupation
In representing occupational status, the variable representing 
respondent's occupation was collapsed into categories based upon job- 
related training requirements and supervisory capacity. The following
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categories consisted of: 1.) unskilled labor (N = 29); 2.) skilled
labor (N — 27);' and 3.) professional\managerial (N — 15).
As an preliminary exploratory technique, the Pearson's R 
correlation coefficient indicated only a moderate loading (P = .2672), 
but with a highly respectable one-tailed significance level (P — .012). 
Interestingly, occupation appears to have little relationship with 
income (R = -.0600, P = .315), indicating that many less socially- 
prestigious jobs result in higher wages than expected and vice verse, or 
that those household incomes which are unexpectedly high in relation to 
occupational status are the result of second incomes.
Utilizing these three occupational status groups, a oneway analysis 
of variance was performed with the informal sanction scale serving as 
the dependent variable (See Table 7). The oneway procedure calculated 
an F value of 2.61 at an .08 level of significance. In addition, the 
Scheffe's Test procedure recognized a significant difference (Alpha - 
.10) in group means between Group 1 (unskilled laborers) and Group 3 
(professional/managerial workers). As hypothesized, the group means 
were lowest (indicating a low perceived severity of informal sanctions) 
among those lowest in occupational status and highest (indicating a high 
perceived severity of informal sanctions) among those highest in
occupational status.
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Oneway Analysis of Variance of Occupational Status and 













Between 2 271.4498 135.7249 2.6149 .0805
Within 68 3529.5361 51.9049
Total 70 3800.9859
Education
Since the education variable consists of only 5 categories, 
collapsing it into broader categories would be of little benefit. In 
examination of education's correlational relationship to occupation and 
income, both coefficients are of low intensity and high probability 
levels, (R - .0312, P - .400) and (R - .0684, P - .257), respectively. 
Educati >n, is appears, is a poor predictor of a l'espondent' s 
occupational status group or his/her household income level.
A oneway analysis of variance was also calculated using the five 
ranges of respondent's educational level as the independent variable and 
the informal sanction scale as the dependent variable (See Table 8).
Not surprisingly, the test resulted in a small F ratio with an equally 
low level of significance (F — .8733, P — .4832). Despite the virtual 
lack of variance among mean scale scores for the five educational 
groups, the average for those with less than an 8th gracfe education is 
considerably higher than those possessing a college degree. Of course, 
the number of respondents falling into both of these educational 
categories is sufficiently small to render these variations little more
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than statistical aberrations. Thus, educational attainment, in and of 
itself as well as in contribution to the social status construct, 
appears to be an insignificant variable in the perceived severity of 
informal sanctions related to DUI.
Table 8
Oneway Analysis of Variance of Educational Level and 
Perception of Severity of Informal Sanctions
Degrees of Sum of Mean F F
Source________ Freedom______ Squares______ Squares Ratio Probability
Between 4 177.0891 44.2723 .8733 .4832
Within 92 4664.0037 50.6957
Total 96 4841.0928
Gender
The relationship between gender and perceived severity of informal 
DUI-related sanctions is hypothesized to be one as it relates directly 
to the notion of deviant behavior. That is, while deviant behavior is 
ideally consistently sanctioned by various social forces, it is more so 
for certain members of society. Various studies have established 
sentencing and fine discrepancies (formal sanctions) based along racial, 
ethnic, and gender lines. If it is. true that, in certain instances, 
females ar'e more severely formally sanctioned than are males, this 
variation should be expected to prevalent in the informal sanctioning 
process as well.
The Pearson's R correlation coefficient for sex and perceived 
severity of informal sanctions is less than moderate but statistically
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significant (R — .2090, P — .018). 'when incorporated into a T-Test 
method of analyzing mean differences between dichotomous groups, a 
Student's t value of -1.64 at a two-tailed probability level of .121 was 
obtained using seperate variance estimates (See Table 9). Although the 
pooled variance estimates are considerably more respectable (t — -2.11,
P — .037), they are an inaccurate indicator due to the large discrepancy 
in the population variance caused by the difference in respective sample 
sizes. As stated by Healey (1984, p. 160), the assumption of equal 
variance in the population can be considered justified as long as sample 
sizes are approximately equal. Given this assumption that both 
populations are normal, the additional assumptions of equal means and 
equal standard deviations amount to postulating that the two populations 
are equal (Blalock 1979, p. 227).
Since the two sample variances will ordinarily be based on 
different numbers of cases, an estimate of the common variance can be 
obtained by taking a weighted average of the sample variances, being 
careful to divide by the proper degrees of freedom in order to obtain an 
unbiased estimated (Blalock 1979, p. 228-229).
However, if normal populations are assumed, the normal computation 
of Student's t scores is somewhat questionable in instances where the 
sample sizes are not too large (approximately less than 50) or where the 
sample sizes are very different. Concerning this problem, Blalock 
(1979, p. 231) r'ecognizes that the difficulty in computation of 
Student's t scores between samples of different sizes arises in proper 
selection of the degrees of freedom. This is true because if the 
respective population variances do not differ greatly, the relative 
sizes of the two fractions within the calculation will be determined
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primarily by their denominators (Blalock 1979).
When sample sizes are such that it is impossible to assume that the 
two populations have the same standard deviations, it is also impossible 
to introduce an accurate value to the common population variance and 
thus form a pooled variance estimate. In this specific case of males 
and females, the problem is two-fold in that the population for females 
is relatively low (N = 14) and the difference between the two samples is 
relatively high.
To alleviate this dilemma, Blalock (1979) offers an alternative 
formula for computing t scores, although there is nothing in this 
modified procedure which requires that the standard deviations be 
unequal. If the respective standard deviations are close to being 
equal, this method will simply be less efficient because of it's 
approximations of the degrees of freedom.
However, despite this identifiable distinction, Blalock (1979, p. 
231) also states that the two methods will usually yield similar results 
if the standard deviations are in fact equal, since both sample standard 
deviations will ordinarily be good estimates of the common population
variance.
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Student's t Score for Males and Females 







Males 86 33.2791 6.950 0.749








Pooled Variance Est. -2.11 98 0.037
Separate Variance Est. -1.64 15.17 0.121
One solution to this problem is to weight accordingly each female 
respondent to decrease the standard deviation by increasing the sample 
size. However, although this method would decrease the population 
variance between males and females without altering the their respective 
population mean, such a technique is discouraged by some statisticians 
because it artificially inflates sample sizes through no other discourse 
other than researcher manipulations.
Since it has been hypothesized that females will rate significantly 
higher on their respective scale scores than will males, a directional 
hypothesis has been stated a priori. Thus, the probability for a one- 
tailed test is raised to a slightly more confident interval (.0555). 
One's gender, in fact, appears to be a moderately significant factor in 
the perception of severity of informal sanctions. And, as hypothesized,
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females are more likely to perceive this severity as greater than are 
males.
Primary Ties
The basic notion of primary ties and their effect on enforcing 
conformist behavior comes from the work on delinquency of social control 
theorists, primarily Travis Hirschi. The underlying premise of this 
theory suggests that an individual's bond to society is the primary 
factor affecting conformist and deviant behavior (Hirschi, 1969). With 
this being the case, one would expect those more socially integrated to 
be more suceptible to perceiving informal sanctioning as severe than 
would those lacking the primary social bonds imperative to the 
enforcement of normative behavior.
To examine the validity of this theoretical assumption, four 
different but related variables will be utilized in the analyses. 
Firstly, the social domain of the family will be addressed, using the 
marital status and example - setting roles of the DUI offenders. This
latter variable asks respondents whether or not they share their current
(
residence with anyone under the age of 18.
The other analysis utilizes the domain of ties to the community.
For this, length of residence (in months) and size of community or 
residence are analyzed seperately. Integration into a community is 
hypothesized to be a formidable factor in the enforcement of conformist 
behavior, and communities smaller in size would be expected to yield a 




As a variable, marital status is comprised of a five-category 
response: 1) single, never married (N = 57); 2) married (N = 26); 3)
separated (N = 3); 4) divorced (N = 13); and 5) widowed (N — 1). As a
primary tie establishing one to the enforcement of societal norms 
through a higher level of social integration, the bonding effects of 
marriage and family should impact considerably the perception of 
severity of informal sanctions.
The Pearson's R statistic indicates only a weak correlation between 
a respondent's marital status and their perception of severity of 
informal sanctions (R - .0854, P - .198). As one might then expect, a 
oneway analysis of variance calculated a uncontestedly low F value of 
.6211 with an F probability of .6486 (See Table 10). One's marital 
status, as it represents an anchor for social bonding, has no 
statistically significant distinguishing feature on the severity of 
perceptions of informal sanctions.
Table 10
Source
Onewav Analvsis of Variance of Marital Status and











Between 4 142.8063 35.7016 .6211 .6486
Within 95 5461.0337 57.4846
Tota 1 99 5603.8400
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However, although it exists without statistical significance, one 
curious deviation in the mean scores across marital status groups is 
apparent (See Table 11). The highest .mean score (36.69) is among those 
respondents reporting a marital status of divorced, indicating that 
detection of their offense may result in some unknown but apparently 
serious perceived informal sanction. Further analysis reveals that when 
asked, "who was the first person you worried about finding out about 
your DUI?”, 30.0 percent of the divorced group indicated their children 
while 20.0 percent reported their ex-spouse. Nonetheless, it appears as 
if simple marital status does not constitute any consistent statistical 
trend as it relates to perception of severity of informal sanctioning.
Table 11
Group





Single 57 33.9825 7.0140 .9290
Married 26 33.2308 7.4313 1.4574
Separated 3 32.3333 5.6862 3.2830
Divorced 13 36.6923 10.2501 2.8429
Widowed 1 29.0000
Ex amp1e-S e 11 ing Roles
A considerable social responsibility in the role of parents and 
older family member; .like is the influence exerted through example - 
setting. Particularly children at an age where societal development and 
critical initiation to norms takes place, a primary family figure may
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feel a sense of failure or humiliation of his/her role due to their 
conviction for DUI. However, depending on the 3ge of the children, 
knowledge and/or realization of the consequences of DUI may not be 
readily recognized. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the financial 
sacrifice made through the fine as well as the loss of license could 
result in a perceived careless sacrifice of resources intended to 
benefit the entire family, children included.
Respondents wtre asked. "How many family members (brothers, 
sisters, children etc.) under the age of 18 currently live with you?".
To aid in the analysis and to gain a more representative number of 
respondents within each category, the number of family members indicated 
was simply collapsed into the following two categoreis: 1.) children 
under 18 currently living with you (N - 32); and 2.) no children under 
18 currently living with you (N - 69),
The Pearson's R coefficient reveals little correlational 
relationship between the two groups coded above and the perceived 
severity of informal sanctioning (R - -.0137, P - .447). Furthermore, 
the T-Test procedure also indicated a non-significant finding with a 
calculated t value of -.90 with Alpha — .165 (See Table 12). However, 
those indicating the presence of family members under the age of 18 
living within their residence did as a group tend to score higher in 
terms of perceived severity of informal sanctions, 34.96 compared to 
33.5? for those with no such younger family members.
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Table 12
Student's t Test of Respondents Living With 
Children Under 18 for Perception 






Yes 32 33.5286 6.792 0.812








Pooled Variance Est. -0.90 100 0.370
Separate Variance Est. -0.82 48.39 0.418
Although the presence and absence of this variable has been shown 
to be of little statistical significance regarding the informal sanction 
scores, further analysis into the matter may prove more revealing in 
terms of theoretical foresight. Once again when asked, "Who was the 
first person you worried about finding out about your DUI?", 44.4 
percent of those having no family members currently residing with them 
indicated some immediate family member, with 7.9 percent specifying 
their spouse.
Those with at least one family member under the age of 18 currently 
residing with them also placed their immediate family at the top of 
their responses of those most fearful of finding out about their DUI.
Of these, a slightly higher percentage (48.2%) indicated an immediate 
family member, with almost twice as large a proportion (13.8) directly
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specifying their spouse. While difficult to establish any statistical 
significance in these percentages given the small sample size and varied 
responses, the seemingly substantial increase in the porportion of 
respondents living in the presence of adolescent family members who 
specified their spouse as the first person they feared finding out about 
their DUI is an interesting segmentation.
Marital Status/Example-Settine Roles
Even though the presence of two individual variables may appear 
to have little interaction with the dependent variable under 
scrutinization, the combination of the effects into a single variable 
sometimes yields different results. As indicated in the previous two 
analyses, marital status was hypothesized to be a significant factor in 
the perception of severity of informal sanctions. Relatedly, immediate 
family members residing within the respndent’s current household was 
used to represent the presence of a socially-defined "example - setting" 
role of the respondent.
A variable was created which combined the presence/absence of these 
two characterictics. Firstly, those respondents who were not married 
(single, separated, divorced, widowed) were assigned a single value, 
with those indicating a married status left as a single value. The 
variable used in the previous analysis, presence/absence of immediate 
family members under the age if 18, was not altered.
The new variable was segmented into four groups: 1) those not 
married with nc> immediate family members under the age of 18 currently 
residing within their household (N = 47); 2) those not married but
indicating at least one immediate family member under the age of 18
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currently residing within their household (N = 11); 3) those married
with no immediate family members under the age of 18 currently residing 
within their household (N — 12); and 4) those married with ah least one 
immediate family member under the age of 18 currently residing within 
their household (N — 14).
A preliminary mean breakdown of scale scores among the four groups 
indicates little variation save Group 3, those who are married but 
indicate no presence of family members under 18 (See Table 13). 
Surprisingly, however, their mean score of 31.58 is noticeably lower 
than the mean (34.03) of their counterparts in Group 1, (those not 
married and without immediate family members under 18 living within 
their household). Of course, when contrasted to Group 4 on the basis of 
their marital status, the difference in means scores is in a direction 
we would theoretically expect. That is, that the presence of immediate 
family members under the age of 18 appears to have a noticeable affect 
on the perception of severity of informal sanctions, hypothesized in 
this study to be sanctioning due primarily to a failed role of an 
example-setter within the family context. In support of this hypothesis 
is the group frequencies Of all DUI offenders within the sample outlined 
in the above paragraph, with 56.4 percent of all respondents occupying 
Group 1 status (unmarried and without immediate family under 18 
currently residing within the same household).
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Table 13
Mean Breakdown of Perception of Severity of 
Informal Sanctions bv




Group 1 56 34.0357 6.7608
Group 2 18 35.2222 9.9028
Group 3 12 31.5833 7.1663
Group 4 14 34.6429 7.6219
Conventional Ties/Social Integration 
Length of Residence
How well a person is integrated into the community's social 
structure depends upon many pertinent factors, many of which are less 
societal characteristics as social-psychological characteristics of the 
individual. While length of residence within a certain community 
environment is not necessarily synonymous with social bonding or 
cohesion, it makes sense theoretically that longer residences should 
play a distinguishing factor in terms of perceived severity of informal 
sanctions. The reverse is also true, that those having shorter 
residency periods have not had adequate time to integrate themselves 
into the existing social structure, complete with the informal 
sanctioning channels established via the medium of various significant 
others.
The variable which measured length of residency of respondent's 
current place of residence was an open ended question recorded in either
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years or months. This latter category was added due to the expected 
number of college students who reside within the immediate 
geographic sample environment, many of which are not year-around 
residents. A variable was then computed which transformed the raw 
scores into a total of months, which ranged from 2 months to 50 years 
(600 months).
In examining the correlations of length of residency of the 
respondent's current community of residence, a moderate negative 
relationship (R = -.2644, P - .004) exists between length of residence 
and whether or not anyone in the respondent's immediate family had ever 
been convicted of a DUI. In this case, those having a family member 
previously convicted were coded with a 1, while those not having a 
family member convicted were assigned a 2. Thus, it appears that those 
respondents with other DUI convictions within their immediate families 
exhibit slightly shorter lengths of residences than do families devoid 
of previous DUI convictions. Also, not surprisingly, length of 
residence maintains a substantial correlation with respondent's age (R 
.2204, P - .015).
For clearer interpretive analysis, the length of residency variabl 
was again transformed, this time collapsing it into the following 
categories: 1) less than 1 year (N « 8); 2) 1-5 years 
(N - 24); 3) 5-10 years (N -9); 4) 10-20 years (N - 33); 5) 20-30 
years (N - 14); 6) 30-40 years (N - 4); and 7) 40-50 years (N - 3).
A oneway analysis of variance using the Scheffe's test procedure 
was conducted, with no two groups appearing statistically significant a 
the .10 confidence level. The oneway yielded a F valm of 1.22 and on 
probability level of .3034, a highly nonsignificant finding (See Table.
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14). In fact, in an attempt to uncover some underlying trends in the 
face of the insignificant difference of means tests, a breakdown of 
scale means was conducted by length of residency groups.
Table 14
Onewav Analysis of Variance of Length of Residence and 












Between 6 404.4529 67.4088 1.2164 .3057
Within 87 4821.2067 55.4162
„ 1A. '■w' • *. 4 93 5225.6596
However, little light is shed upon the possible existence of any 
underlying trend in the mean score distributions. Aside from those 
respondents who had lived in their current community of residence for 
less than 1 year (Group 1), all other averages varied quite little over 
categories (See Table 15). while the overall population maintained a 
mean score of 33.98. Group 1 was substantial)/ higher, at 40.42. While 
the hypothesis concerning this relationship would expect a significant 
difference, it would expect it to be in the opposite direction (lower 
rather than higher). According to these findings (although they are not 
statistically significant), those respondents having resided within 
their present community are perceive the informal sanctions related to 
their DUI as more severe than those who have lived in their respective 
communities longer. This could indicate some degree of social- 
vulnerability in the early stages of the community-integration process, 




Mean Breakdown of Perception of Severity of






< 1 year 7 40.4286 11.2969 4.2698
1 - 5  yrs. 24 33.9167 7.8735 1.6072
5 - 10 yrs. 9 31.6667 7.3314 2.4438
10 - 20 yrs. 33 33.4848 6.9242 1.2054
20 - 30 yrs. 14 33.0000 6.9614 1.8605
30 - A0 yrs. 4 31.2500 2.7538 1.3769
40 - 50 yrs. 3 31.3333 2.5166 1.4530
Size of Current Community of Residence
The relationship between the size of respondent's community of 
residence and their perception of severity of informal sanctions 
states that, because of the more; anonymous and impersonal setting of 
highly populated environments, respondents living within these areas 
will perceive their DUI-related informal sanctions as less severe than 
those residing in smaller more cohesive communities. The variable 
recording respondent's respective community of residence size is 
comprised of the following categories: 1.) farm (N — 6); 2.) rural (<
2.500) (N - 9); 3.) small town (2,500-10,000) (N = 7); 4.) town 
(10.000-25,000) (N - 7); 5.) city (25,000-100,000) (N ™ 62); and 6.) 
metropolitan (100,000+) (N ■= 8).
The Pearson's R correlation coefficient reveals almost no
measurable association between the size of respondent's community of
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residence and their perceived severity of informal sanctions 
(R - .0059, P = .477). Further analysis reveals some noticable 
differences, although the mean scores fluctuate in a way which is not 
totally explainable. While our hypothesis purports that those in 
metropolitan areas will perceive the severity of informal sanctions as 
lesser than more "personal" environments, it also assumes that such a 
relationship is gradiated consistently and accordingly as size of 
community of residence changes. Judging from the mean values outlined 
in Table 16, while the former statement appears to be partly justified, 
any progressive coherence between the two is highly reluctant. To 
further substantiate the lack of statistical significance, a oneway 
analysis of variance reveals an F value of 1.2258 at a probability level 
of .3034 (See Table 17). Thus, it seems the hypothesis which states 
that community of origin size is a significantly discriminating variable 
in the perception of severity of informal DUI-related sanctioning is not 
supported by the data.
Table 16
dean Breakdown of Perception of Severity of 






farm 6 33.6667 5.5377 2.2608
rural 9 35.8889 7.8652 2.6217
small town 7 29.8571 7.2440 2.7380
town 7 33.2857 4.4615 1.6863
city 61 34.9672 7.8123 1.0003
metro 8 29.8750 8.4251 2.9787
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Table 17
Oneway Analysis of Variance of Size of Community of Residence










Between 5 349.1826 69.8365 1.2258 .3034




This exploratory study was undertaken to investigate the effects of 
certain personal and social characteristics on the perception of 
severity of informal sanctions related to DUI. The basic finding from 
this research suggests that various elements appear to play a consistent 
and theoretically specified role in the informal sanctioning of DUI 
offenders, although in most cases the differences are statistically 
significant at only a conservative magnitude.
Research into the perceived sanction fear of various formalized 
punishments suggest that certainty, severity, and celerity play a 
fundamental role in the deterrent function of sanctions. The role of 
the informal sanction, however, is still unknown. Nonetheless, 
speculative research might suggest that informal sanctions, like 
formalized ones, are not applied to each individual offender at an equal 
intensity or severity. Oftentimes, this discrepancy is simply the 
result of a lack cf appropriate significant others from which the most 
severe informal sanctions usually originate. At other times, the 
socially-affixed "antennae" of the offender are not adequately 
perceptive to recognize these negative social control forces, despite 
their uncontested existance by others in the informal collective.
One characteristic which seems to radiate a measurable affects on 
the severity of informal sanction perceptions is the gender of the
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offender. An argument can be made that the offense of drinking-and- 
driving, while maintaining a questionable status regarding it's 
inclusion into the realm of "bonafide" deviant behavior, is nonetheless 
considered largely a male offense. That is, even those who partake in 
deviant behavior are themselves subject to informal norms governing the 
expected type of offender for that particular behavior. Thus, females 
as a whole do not constitute the overall societal perception of one who 
is arrested for driving while impaired. For this reason, informal 
sanctioning toward females was shown to be noticeably higher in terms of 
perceived severity.
Occupational status was also shown to constitute a moderately 
significant factor in the perceived severity of DUI-related informal 
sanctions. Similar in nature to the relationship with respondent's 
gender addressed earlier, those respondents who commanded more socially - 
prestigious positions in the category of professional/managerial 
indicated feeling the pressure of informal sanctions more than.did those 
workers employed in the skilled or unskilled labor fields. Although a 
disproportionately low number of offenders are situated within this 
highest occupational status group, perhaps a more epidemiological 
approach could be taken to discern from offender characteristics exactly 
whv certain social groups are consistently underrepresented in DUI 
arrest statistics.
The lack of significant statistical findings when looking at the 
constructed variable of social status is not surprising, as it appears 
to have been a poor indicator of status due to the unweighted 
contributions of occupational status, income, and education. Analyzed 
separately, however, the effect of each respective variable was more
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accurately discerned. While attained educational levels showed their 
lack of utility as a viable predictor of severity of informal sanction 
scores, income was more significant if not considerably more 
interesting. Collapsed into four income brackets, the scale scores 
increased steadily as income levels increased until the highest category 
($40,000 and greater). At this level, the mean unexpectedly dropped off 
considerably. Although this latter category is based upon only five 
respondents, such a distribution is curious. Certainly, regardless of 
whether such an unusual distribution is found to be little more than a 
statistical aberration, this finding seems ample cause for further 
exploration•into the apparent relationship.
The basic premise concerning the effects of primary ties on 
normative behavior is put forth by the social control theorists, 
primarily Travis Hirschi. According to this theory as it was initially 
applied to juvenile delinquency, an individual's bond to society is the 
primary factor affecting deviant behavior. The marital status and the 
presence of an socially-defined example - setting role of the respondent 
as indicators of this social bond. Marital status, however, proved to 
be a poor predictor of perceived severity of informal sanctions.
Although those respondents who were divorced indicated the highest 
scores in terms of perceived severity of sanctions, the mean scores 
between those respondents reporting married and single marital status 
did not vary considerably.
The presence of a socially-defined example-setting role also shed 
little light on establishing this variable as a viable influence on 
respondents' perceived severity of informal sanctions. In fact, 
although the difference of mean scores is far from significant, the
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direction of increase is opposite of that stated in the related 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, although the analysis fails to confirm this 
hypothesis, the lack of significant difference is also a reasonably 
sufficient factor to discourage prematurely specifying a theoretical 
alternative. Clearly, more research is needed in this area, perhaps 
utilizing a more firmly grounded and established array of primary tie 
indicants.
As previously stated, marital status appears to be a relatively 
poor indicator regarding the severity of informal social sanctions, as 
is the presence of an example-setting role. Taken together, however, 
the findings are more interesting. While the marital status again 
appears to be of little distinguishing effect, the presence of children 
under the age of 18 living with the respondent appears to have an 
heightening effect on both marital status groups (married and unmarried) 
in terms of the perceived severity of social sanctions. Again, such an 
analysis is complicated due to the tremendous homogeneity of the sample 
(young, male, single, etc.).
Another construct derived from Hirschi's Social Control Theory is 
the community integration aspect of social bonding. Firstly, the 
variable which measured respondent's length of current residence was 
used to test the hypothesis that, assuming longer residences resulted in 
a greater integration into the community, length of residency should be 
positively correlated with the perceived severity of informal sanctions. 
The analysis of variance test, however, did not support this hypothesis, 
in fact, the reverse was shown to exist, although not to a great extent. 
That is, those -who had resided in their respective communities the 
shortest amount of time (< 1 year) reported the highest mean score
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(greater severity of informal sanctions) of any other group. Admittedly, 
judging from this, the failure to support this hypothesis may in fact 
lie in the theoretical framework. Although this may still be reflective 
of a less integrated bonding into the community, it appears that 
relative newcomers within their community environment are perceiving the 
severity of their DUI-related informal sanctions to be much greater than 
would be expected. Perhaps this "pre-integration” stage is perceived as 
an essential time in the social- integration process rather than a time 
which allows one a sort of temporary semi-anonymous existence.
Lastly, some support was shown to support the hypothesis that the 
size of the community of residence played a viable part in the 
prediction of mean scale scores. Although a statistically significant 
difference was not established, the basic premise of the hypothesis was 
supported. Those respondents living within a small town environment 
(<2,500) scored highest in terms of perceived severity of informal 
sanctions, while those within metropolitan areas (100,000+) scored the 
highest.
Potential Pol icy Implications
While the results discussed here are far from conclusive that 
certain personal and social characteristics are accurate predictors of 
DUI-related informal sanctioning, they should be interpreted 
theoretically rather than statistically. That is, the findings both in 
support and in dissention of the stated hypotheses should serve as a 
foundation for further research into the informal effects of DUI
sanctions on various types of offenders.
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For instance, a more precise and valid scale for measuring the 
construct of informal sanctions can be derived from this study. Also, 
the content validity of the construct could easily be modified to 
include other significant collectives thought to be a primary medium for 
informal sanctions (i.e., the church).
Also, and perhaps most importantly, there should be a melding 
together of formalized sanctioning entities with this future research 
on the informalized effects. From this, the courts and public interest 
groups alike could adopt various deterrent strategies aimed at specific 
social cohorts shown to be particularly susceptible to certain informal 
sanctions. Such an implementation could be effectively utilized at both 
the general and the specific stages of DUI deterrence. If the fear of 
mandatory prescribed formal sanctions (fine, loss of license, etc.) is 
simply a function of one's availability to resources (a good lawyer, 
alternative transportation, etc.), perhaps punishment of another nature 
should be prescribed drawing upon one's established fear of informal 
sanctions. A temporary loss of social status among those seemingly 
immune to the formal implications of DUI may serve to better deter 
themselves and others similar to them from driving while impaired.
Nonetheless, future research should focus upon this highly dynamic 
force within this timely issue. When further research can better 
establish the relationships between informal sanctions and how they 
affect various different members of society, then more effective 










DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOQY 
Bo* 8192. University Station 
Grand Forks. North Dakota 58202 
(701) 777-2187
As of late, you’ ve probably been on the listening end of most 
conversations involving DU I and similar alcohol-related driving offenses. 
I ron ica l ly ,  however, few studies have focused on the individual effects and 
experiences of those people whose views actually matter. In this sense, you 
are a valuable resource. The following short questionnaire is interested in 
YOUR opinions on the subject.
F i l l ing  out this questionnaire is ent ire ly  voluntary. It  is not a 
mandatory part of the DUI program and there are no sanctions or penalties of 
any kind should you choose not to part icipate.  While your individual 
viewpoints are essential , so is your freedom of choice. Whatever your 
decision, I thank you for vour time and wish you the best in the future.
PI ease check one:
□ I wish to participate in the study by completing the attached 
questionnaire.
I choose not to participate 
uncompleted questionnaire to
n the study and am returning the 
the staff  counselor.
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f i l l i n g  out th is  form w il l  only taka several minutes. Mott of your answers 
can be made simply by placing a check mark In the box provided. Although a 
few questions may require a»ore th inking than o thers , I t ’ s best to mark the 
f i r s t  response which occurs to you. A ll answers are s t r ic t  1y confI dent Ia l 
and your partlc Ip a tlon  Is to ta l ly  anonymous.' Vou CANNOT be 1 dent I f le d . so 
fee! free to be honest In your responses.
1. lis te d  below are statements.w1 th which you may or may not agree. Please 
Ind icate the extent of your agreement or disagreement by checking the 
appropriate box to the right of each se le c tio n .
(«tror|J y (mt »t*n|f 
d1 TC
SA A Neutral 0 SO
(X ! )
because of the tougher DUl laws, fewer 
people are d riv ing  while Impaired. □ □ □ □ □
(X2)
Someone who makes S5D.00C a year Is  Ju s t 
as l ik e ly  to be arrested fo r DUI as 
someone who makes I 15,000. D □ □ □ □
(X3)
Getting a DUI Is simply a matter of 
odds. Everyone who drives while 
Impaired eventua lly  loses. □ □ D □ C ~ J
(X4)
O ve ra ll, law enforcement agencies are 
fa ir  and unbiased In th e ir  apprehension 
of Impaired d r ive rs . C D a □ Cj □
(X5)
Being arrested fo r OUI Is  nothing more 
than being In the wrong place at the 
wrong time. □ □ □ □ Cj
(X6)
Once you’ ve been arrested for any one 
a lcohol-related d riv ing  offense, the 
po lice  have b a s ic a lly  ’ got your number.* CJ □ □ D □
(X7)
Those arrested for d r iv in g  while Impaired 
from the use con tro lled  substances 
(m arijuana, cocaine, e tc . )  should b* 
treated  no d if fe re n t ly  than those 
arrested- 7or d riv ing  impaired from 
drinking a lcoho l. □ 1 i □ □ □
(X8)
Most people arrested  fo r DUI arc people 
who have been drinking and d riv ing  for 
years . CJ □ □ □ □
(X9)
Even a fte r  m ultip le  DUI a rres ts , most 
people simply return to th e ir old ways 
of try ing  tc ’ beat the odds.* □ a □ □ l U
(X !0 )
Those most supportive of tougher DUI 
laws are people who are against drink ing  
rather than d riv ing  a f te r  drinking. n □ □ C J CJ
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$A A Neutra1 0 so
( X I I ) Most OUI offender* are problem a lco h o lics . □ □ □ □ □
(X I 2)
Younger people stand a greater chance 
of being arrested for OUI simply 
because they haven't had enough practice  
at d riv ing  while Impaired, a □ □ a □
(X 1 3) fveryone arrested for OUI deserves 
everything they get. □ □ □ □ □
(X I 4)
Nightclubs and other liquor 
establishments have a public 
re sp o n s ib ility  to help th e ir  customers 
avoid d riv ing  a fte r  drinking. □ □ □ a □
(X15)
Compared to other crim es, the penalties 
lev ied  against OUI offenders are not 
that bad. □ □ a □ a
(X16)
The po lice  and the courts In  some parts 
of North Dakota trea t DUIs tougher than 
others. □ □ □ □ a
(X I 7) females arrested fo r OUI are ty p ic a l ly  
more masculine and outgoing. □ □ □ □ □
(X18)
Because they are un in ten tiona l, 
t r a f f ic  In ju r ie s  caused by Impaired 
d rivers should not be punishable by 
prison sentences. □ □ □ □ □
( X I9)
A ll cases of OUI should not be treated 
the same by law because there are 
d iffe re n t circumstances In each Instance. □ □ □ □ □
(X20)
There are times when driv ing  while 
Impaired should be overlooked simply 
because I t  cannot be avoided. □ □ □ □ C j
<X2I) As long as no one Is  hurt, d r iv in g  while 
Impaired should not be a crime. □ □ □ □ □
(X22)
The biggest part o f avoiding a DUI 1s 
knowing how to act when stopped by the 
po lice . a □ □ a □
(X23) Uonen convicted of OUI are more 1<kely to get larger fines than males. □ □ □ a
(X26) The p o s s ib i l ity  o f someone a c tu a lly  being Injured by a drunk d r iv e r  are very low. □ □ n a □
(X25)
Anyone who can affo rd  a good lawyer can 
beat a DUI rap, no matter 1f they are
g u ilty  or not. a a □ □ □
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0
SA A Neutra 1 0 SO
(X26)
Despite a ll the exposure, *ost people 
s t i l l  see DUI as t r a f f ic  offense rather 
than a crime. □ a □ □ □
(X27)
At one time or another, everyone who 
drives a fte r  drinking thinks about 
getting a OUI. □ □ □ □ □
I I .  Once again, the following are statements with which you nay or may not 
ayree. Rather than genera) views, however, these statements pertain  to your 
own most recent experience. Please In d ica te  the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement by checking the appropriate box to the r ig h t of each statement.
(•tron*]y





The thing that bothered »e most about 
getting  a 001 was how my fam ily would 
react. a □ □ □ □
(2 2 )
I 'v e  acted out 1n ray head what to say 
and how to act I f  I were ever stopped 
by the po lice  while d riv ing  drunk. □ □ □ a □
(2 3 )
After th is  a rre s t , I would volunteer 
m yself as the ’ L ife  of the Party* for 
an evening to ensure a sober ride home 
for ray fr ien ds. □ □ a □ □
(2 4 )
Before ay offense, I was well aware of 
the consequences Involved with getting  
a OUI. □ □ □ □ a
(2 5 )
I f  stopped while being le g a lly  Im paired, 
I'm confident I could ‘ beat the rap" 
on another DUI. □ □ □ a □
(2 6 ) I don 't care what others night think 
about my getting  a DUI. □ □ a □ □
(2 7 )
I f  the names o f people arrested for OUI 
were printed on the front page of the 
hoaetown newspaper-, a rrests would 
decrease noticeab ly. □ □ □ □ □
(2 6 )
After my a r re s t ,  I worried that ay 
co-workers or fam ily might think I had 
a drinking problem. □ □ a □ □
(2 9 )
Most of the a tten tion  I got from «y 
fatal ly  regarding my OUI was l i t t l e  rtore 
than good natured kidding. □ □ □ □ □
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SA A Heytr t 1 D so
(Z10)
Because of my OU!, I no longer hive the 
tame re la tionsh ip  with my superiors i t  
work i t  i did before. □ □ □ !Z3 CD
(Z l 1 )
My DUI was damaging to me because of 
an ob ligation  ! have to setting  a good 
example at horse and/or at work. □ □ □ L j CU
(Z l 2)
The fine and loss of license doesn't even 
come close to the stra in  pot on ray fam ily 
and my personal 11 fe. □ □ □ □ □
(Z l 3)
The fines end Increased Insurance rates 
are tough, but not nearly as bad as having 
to make a public appearance 1n court. □ □ □ a
( Z l i )
To me, getting caught was more 
eabarasslng than the legal Im plications 
of a c tu a lly  being arrested. □ □ □ □ □
( Z I5)
Rather than being something to h ide, my 
my OUI has earned the admiration of my 
closest fr ien ds. □ a CH □ □
(Z I 6) My fam ily wasn't surprised when 1 got my OUI. □ □ □ □ □
(Z l 7)
The f i r s t  thing I thought about a fte r 
being convicted for DUI was how I was 
going to survive without a drivers 
1 Icense. □ □ □ u o
(Z10)
i f  I cou ld 've  arranged i t ,  I would have 
payed an additional fine tc have ray name 
kept out of the local newspaper. □ □ □ □ a
(Z l 9)
Despite the thousands of do lla rs generated 
by fines every year, getting a DC! is more 
damaging s o c ia lly  than f in a n c ia lly . □ □ a □ L J
(Z20)
I f  I volunteered to stay sober and drive  
the en tire  n ight, my friends would tease 
me for "wimping out* on a good time. □ □ □ □ □
(Z 2 I)
My getting a DUI has »ada my friends 
a lo t  more fearfu l about d riv ing  
drunk. a □ □ lJ □
(2.22) Embarassment hurts mere than coney. □ □ □ o a
(Z2 31
' f 1 rvd I t  d i f f ic u l t  no* (0 drink 1f 
those around me are drinking. □ □ □ LJ
(Z 2 i)
* f te r being arrested , i was a fra id  people 
would label me e drunk or an a lco h o lic . □ □ □ CJ □
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F
SA A Neutral 0 so
I can avoid another DU! without a lte rin g
□ □ □(Z25) my current 11festy le .
Getting a DUI 1s a status symbol that
□ □
(Z26) shows »y friends I 'a  a drdlcated 
party ie r. □ □ □ a □
Date of B ir th : Sex: H F
Which of the follow ing alcohol-related d r iv in g  offenses required you to 
p artic ip a te  in th is  prograe? (check a l l  that app ly.)
____ DUI (d r iv in g  while Impaired)
____ APC (actual physical con tro l)
__ [ minor in possession
_____ open container
____  o t h e r : _____________________________________________________________________
Was th is  your f i r s t  such offense? _______  y e s ._______no I f  no, please
s p e c i f y :_________________________________________________________________________
Approximately how far from your home did the offense occur? _______  miles
were you given soar type of alcohol test (blood te s t , in to x iiy te r , e t c . ) ?  
ye : ___ _ n o ______I f  yes , what was your blood-alcohol content? ____________
Are you curren ly employed?______y e s ______ no I f  yes, what is your'
occupat ion?
What is  your present marital status?
_  s in g le , never aarrted divorced
_  married widowed
_____  separated
Ho*? many fam ily members (b ro thers, s is te r s ,  ch ild ren , e tc . )  under the age 
of 18 cu rren tly  l iv e  with you?
Meuse ind icate  the stye of the ccenunity 
_____ f#'T
______ -ural (less  than ?,S00 )
_____ small town (?  .800-1 0,000)
How long have you r es i d ed  In t h i s
in which you presently live-
town (10,000- '/.'j,000) 
c it y  ( ? S ,000-100,000) 
metropolitan (Over 100,000)
please c ! r c I e  one 
lo c a t io n ?  _  years months
3 A
Which of tha fo llow ing categories best describes your net household 
Income for the pest year? (approximate Income e fte r  tax e t)
JO - $4,999 
$5,000 - $9,999 
$10,000 - $14,999 
$15,000 - $19,999 
$20,000 - $24,999
$25,000 - $29,999 
$30,000 - $34 ,999 
$35,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $44,999 
$45,000 - $49,999 
$50,000 or above
What Is the highest grade you completed In school?
1 through 8 ______  13-15 (some college or
trade school)
9 through 11
______ 12 {high school grad) ______  16 ♦ (co llege  grad or more)
lias anyone 1n your Immediate fam ily  ever gotten a DUI? ______  yes ______  no
At what age do you f i r s t  remember rid in g  as a passenger 1n a car with someone 
who was Impaired? _____________  years old
How old were you the f i r s t  time you drove when you fe l t  le g a lly  impaired? 
______________  years old
Going back 1 year from the time you were c ited  for DUI, approximately how many 






21-30 61-70 over 100
Try and remember back to the exact moment you were arrested for DUJ. Who 
was the f i r s t  person you worried about find ing  out? (e x . ,  boss, rooemate,
e t c . ) ____________________________________________________________________ ______________
Co orients:




Reliability Analysis of Informal Sanctioning Scale
Scale Items
1. ZI Bothered me the most was family reaction
2. Z6 Don't care what others think about my DUI
3. Z7 Arrests would decline if names printed in front page
4. Z10 No longer have the same relationship with co-workers
5. Zll Damaging to my obligation at work/home
6. Z12 Fine/loss of .license not as great as effect on family
7. Z13 Fine/insurance rates not as bad as court appearance
8. Z14 Getting caught more embarassing than legal impacts
9. Z16 My family was not surprised with my DUI
10. Z18 Would have paid extra to have name kept out of paper
11. Z19 DUI is more embarassing socially than financially
12. Z22 Embarassment'hurts more than money
13. Z24 Afraid of being labeled a drunk or an alcoholic
T tern
Item-Total Statistics














Z22 31.4457 . 7902
Z24 31.5543 .7927
Number of Cases = 92 Number of Items —• 13





1973 Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach. Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.
Anderson
1977
Linda S., Theodore G. Chiricos and Gordon P. Waldo 
"Formal and Informal Sanctions: A Comparison of Deterrent 
Effects." -Social Problems 25:103-114.
Antunes, George and A. Lee Hunt
1973 "The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on
Levels of Crime in American States: An Extended Analysis. 
The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 64(4):486-493.
Bankston, William B., Quentin A.L. Jenkins, Cheryl Thayer-Doyle and 
Carol Y. Thompson
1986 "Fear of the Drunken Driver: Analysis of an Emergent 
Social Problem." Deviant Behavior 7:107-120.
Beccaria, Cesare
1963 On Crimes and Punishments. Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs- 
Merrill.
Beck, Kenneth H. and Terry G. Summons
1985 "A Comparison of the Social Context for Alcohol Consumption
of College Students and Convicted DUI Offenders." Journal of 
Alcohol and Drug Education 31:31-39.
Bentham, Jeremy
1962 The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Bowring ed., Vol. I). New 
York: Russell and Russell.
Blalock, Hubert M., Jr.
1979 Social Statistics (Revised Second Edition). New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Borkenstein, Robert F.
1974 "Problems of Enforcement, Adjudication, and Sanctioning." 
Alcohol. Drugs, and Traffic Safety: Proceedings of the 
Sixth International Conference on Alcohol. Drugs. and 
Traffic Safety September 8-13:655-662.
Borkenstein, Robert F., Robert F. Crowther, Ronald P. Shumate,
William B. Ziel and Prichard Zylman
1969 The Role of the Drinking Driver in Traffic Accidents.




Bowers, William J. and Richard D. Salem
1972 "Severity of Formal Sanctions as a Repressive Response to 
Deviant Behavior." Law and Society Review 6:427-441.
Carlson, William L.
1973 "Age, Exposure, and Alcohol Involvement in Night Crashes." 
Journal of Safety Research 5:247-259.
Carlson, William L. and Donald Klein
1970 "Familial vs. Institutional Socialization of the Young 
Traffic Offender." Journal of Safety Research 2:13-25.
Carmines, Edward G. and Richard A. Zeller
1979 Reliability and Validity Assessment. Sage University Paper 
series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 
series no. 07-017, Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications Inc.
Carroll, Philip S., William L. Carlson, Thomas L. KcDole and Donald W.
Smith
1970 Acquisition of Information on Exposure and on Nonfatal
Crashes. Report No. 03169, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Highway Safety 
Research Institute, Michigan, 1971.
Chiricos, Theodore G. and Gordon P. Waldo
1970 "Punishment and Crime: An Examination of Some Empirical 
Evidence." Social Problems 18:200-217.
Clark, Alexander A. and Jack P. Gibbs
1965 "Social Control: A Reformulation." Social Problems 12:398- 
415.
Daniel S.
"Comparison of Risk Perception Between Delinquents and Non- 
Delinquents ." The Journal of Criminal Law. Criminolop.v and 
Police Science 58:80-86.
Cohen, Albert K. .
1966 Deviance and Control. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall.
Cooper, Harold H.A.




Cosper, Ronald and Kenneth Mozersky
1968 "Social Correlates of Drinking and Driving." On. rterlv





"Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of 
Deterrence." Michigan Law Review 67:421-454.
Cramton, Roger C.




1977 "General Deterrence and Police Enforcement: Effective




Maynard L., Jack F. Gibbs and Gary F. Jensen
"The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of
Legal Punishments." American Sociological Review 42:305-
317.
Faley. Thomas and James. T. Tedeschi
1971 "Status and Reaction to Threats." Journal of Personality 




"Drunk Driving Conviction Not Sufficient To Dismiss Tenured 
Teacher." Phi Delta Kappan 4:588-589.
Geerken. 
1975
Michael R. and Walter R. Gove 






"Mundane Crime." Crime and Juvenile Delinquency 29 
(2) : 217-233.
Gibbs, Jack P.
1975 Crime. Punishment, and Deterrence. New York: Elsevier 
Scientific Publishing Company, Inc.
Crasmick, Harold G. and Donald E. Green
1980 "Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as 
Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior." The Journal of Criminal 
Law & Crimi nology 71(3):325- 335.
Gurnack, Anne M.
1986 "Population Characteristics of Drunk Drivers Referred For
Assessment in Two Wisconsin Counties 1981-1983." Journal of 
Alcohol and Drug Education 31:8-22.
Gusfield, Joseph R.
1986 Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American
Temperance Movement (Second Edition). Urbana and Chicago, 
Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
91
Gusfield, Joseph R
1981 The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the 
Symbolic Order. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Healey, Joseph F.
1984 Statistics: A Tool for Social Research. Belmont 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Hirschi, Travis
1969 Causes of Delinauencv. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.
Hollinger, Richard C
1984 "Race, Occupational Status, and Pro-Active Police Arrest for 
Drinking and Driving." Journal of Criminal Justice 12:173- 
183.
Homans, George C.
1961 Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World.
Hurst, Paul M.
1973 "Epidemiological Aspects of Alcohol in Driver Crashes and 
Citations." Journal of Safety Research 5(3):130-148.
Hyman, Merton M.
1968 "The Social Characteristics of Persons Arrested for Driving 
Driving While Intoxicated." Quarterly Journal of Studies on 
Alcohol. Supplement No. 4:138-177.
Jensen, Gary F.
1969 "’Crime Doesn't Pay’: Correlates of a Shared 
Misunderstanding." Social Problems 17:189-201.
Jones, Robert K.
1977 "Alcohol and Highway Crashes: A Projection for the 1980s 
University of Michigan Traffic Safety Research Institute 
Research Preview ' 7 (5) : 1 -16 .
Kim, Jae-On and Charles W. Mueller
1986 Introduction to Factor Analysis: What It Is and How To Use 
It. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative 
Applications in the Social Sciences, series no. 07-013, 
Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Klein, Donald
1968 "The Teen-Age Driver: A Research Paradigm." Traffic 
Quarterly 1968:97-107.
Larsen. Donald E. and Baha Abu-Laban




1968 The Effectiveness of Punishment: Especially in Relation to 
Traffic Accidents. South Hackensack, N.J.: Fred B. Rothman 
and Sons.
Mills, Charles Wright
1959 The Sociological Imagination. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
Morris, Norval and Gordon Hawkins
1970 The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control. Chicago:
Mulford. 
i964
University of Chicago Press.
Harold A.
"Iowa's Drinking Driver, 1961; With a Method for Identifying 
Drinkine Drivers in a Survev Population.” Social Problems 
12:196-211.
Nathan, Peter E.
1983 "Failures in Prevention: Why We Can't Prevent the
Devastating Effect of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse." American 
Isychologist 38 (A):459-467.
National Safety Council
1987 Accident Facts: 1987 Edition. Chicago: National Safety 
Council.
North Dakota State Highway Department
1987 1986 Vehicular Accident Facts. North Dakota State Hir.hwav 
Department Drivers License and Traffic Safety Division.
Pandiani, John A. and Robert J. McGrath
1986 "Attempts to Dissuade Drinkers from Driving: The Effect of 
Driver Characteristics." Journal of Drug Education 16 
(4) :341-348.
Pedhazur, Elazar J.
1982 Mul tide Rer.ression in Behavioral Research: Explanation 
and Prediction (Second Edition!. Now York: Holt. Rinehart 
and Winston.
Pelt, Donald C., Thomas L. McDole, and Stanley H. Schumnn
1975 "Drinking-Driving Behavior of Young Men in Relation to 
Accidents." Journal of Studies on Alcohol 36:956-972.
Phillips, 
198 A
Llad, Subhash Ray, and Harold L. V^tey, Jr.
"Forecasting Highway Casualties: The British Road Safety 
Act and a Sense of Deia Vu." Journal of Crimi nal. Justi ce 
12:101-114.
93
Ret:tig, Solomon and Harve E. Rawson
1963 "The Risk Hypothesis in Predictive Judgments of Unethical
Behavior." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 66(3): 
243-248.
Ross, Hugh Laurence
1984a Deterring the Drinking Driver: Legal Policy and Social 
Control (Revised and Updated Edition). Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company.
Ross, Hugh Laurence
1984b "Social Control Through Deterrence: Dr5nking-And-Driving 
Laws." Annual Review of Sociology 10:21-35.
Ross, Hugh Laurence
1977 "Deterrence Regained: The Cheshire Constabulary's
'Breathalyzer Blitz'." Journal of Legal Studies 6:241-249.
Ross, Hugh Laurence
1976 "The Neutralization of Severe Penalties: Some Traffic Law 
Studies.” Law and Society Review 10:403-413.
Ross, Hugh Laurence
1975 "The Scandanavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and- 
Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway." Journal of Legal 
Studies 4:285-310.
Ross, Hugh Laurence
1960 "Traffic Law Violation: A Folk Crime." Social Problems 
8:231-241.
Ross. Hugh Laurence and Murray Blumenthal
1974 "Sanctions for the Drinking Driver: An Experimental Study." 
Journal of Legal Studies 3(1):53-61.
Ross, Hugh Laurence, R. McCleary, and T. Epperlein
1982 "Deterrence of Drinking and Driving in France: An
Evaluation of the Law of July 12, 1978." Lav; and Society 
Rev i ew 16:398-417;
Roizen, J.
1982 "Estimating Alcohol Involvement in Serious Events."
Alcohol Consumption and Related Problems. Alcohol and Health 
Monograph No. 1, Rockville, Maryland: National Institute on 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.
Salem. Richard G. and William J. Bowers
1970 "Severity of Formal Sanctions as a Deterrent to Deviant. 
Behavior.” Law and Society Review 5:21-40.
94
Schneider. Joseph W.
1978 "Deviant Drinking as Disease: Alcoholism as a Social 
Accomplishment." Social Problems 25:361-372.
Schur, Edwin
1971 Labelling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications. 
New York: Harper and Rowe.
Schwartz, Richard D. and Sonya Orleans
1967 "On Legal Sanctions." The. University of Chicago Law Review. 
34:274-300.
Shoham, S. Giora
1974 "Punishment and Traffic Offenses." Traffic Quarterly 28:61- 
73.
Shoham, S. Giora, Nehemia Geva, Rachel Markowski and Nava Kaplinsky
1976 "Internalisation of Norms, Risk-Perception '~d Anxiety as 
Related to Driving Offenses." British Joui. uni of 
Criminology 16:142-155.
Shover, Neal, William B. Bankston and J. William Gurley
1977 "Responses of the Criminal Justice System to Legislation 
Providing More Severe Threatened Sanctions." Cr 1 minol or.v 
14(4):483-499.
Sigelman, Carol K. and Lee Sigelman
1976 "Authority and Conformity: Violation of a Traffic
Regulation." The Journal of Social Psychology 100:35-43.
Sinha. Jai B.
1967 "Ethical Risk and Censure-Avoiding Behavior." The Journal of 
Social Psychology 71:267-275,
Smith. Thomas
1926 Torpor: An improbable Adventure. New York: McBride.
Snorturn. John R.
1984 "Controlling the Alcohol- Impaired Driver in Scandanavia and 
the United States: Simple Deterrence and Beyond." Journal 
of Criminal Justice 12:131-148.
SPSS. Inc.
1986 SPSS-X User’s Guide: Second Edition. Chicago, Illinois: 
SPSS. Inc.
Sykes, Gary W.
1984 "Saturated Enforcement: The Efficacy of Deterrence and 
Drunk Driving." Journal of Criminal Justice 12:185-197.
95
Teevan, James J.
1972 "Deterrent Effects of Punishment: The Canadian Case."
Deviant Behavior and Societal Reaction in Canada. Toronto: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Ltd.
Tillman, 
1968
Walter A. and George E. Hobbs 




1980 Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence. 
New York: Praeger Publishers.
Tittle, Charles R.
1977 "Sanction Fear and the Maintenance of Social Order." Social 
Forces 55(3):579-596.
Tittle, Charles R.




Charles R. and Charles H. Logan
"Sanctions and Deviance. Evidence and Remaining Questions. 
Law and Society Review 7:371-392.
Tittle, Charles R. and Alan R. Rowe
1973 "Moral Appeal. Sanction Threat, and Deviance: An 
Experimental Test." Social Problems 20:488-498.
U.S. Department of Justice
1987 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics - 1986. Albany, 
New York: The Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center.
U.S. Department of Justice
1986 The Enforcement of Fines as Criminal. Sanctions: The English 
Experience and Its Relevance to American Practice. New 
York: The Vera Institute of Justice.
U.S. Department of Justice
1984 Fines In Sentencing:: A Study of the Use of the Fine as a 
Criminal Sanction. New York: The Vera Institute of 
Justice.
U.S. Department of Transportation 




1983 "Norms and Attitudes Related to Alcohol Usage and Driving.
In Research Notes. The U.S. Department of Transportation 
National Highway Traffic Safety Commission. Contract No. 
DTNH22-81-C-07385.
Waldo, Gordon P. and Theodore G. Chiricos
1972 "Perceived Penal Sanction and Seif-Reported 





1975 "Prearrest Behavior of Persons Convicted of Driving While 
Intoxicated." Journal of Studies on Alcohol 36:1573-1577.
Yoder. Richard D. and Robert A. Moore
1973 "Characteristics of Drunken Drivers." Quarterly Journal of 
Studies on Alcohol. 34:927-936.
Zimring, Franklin E. and Gordon Hawkins
1°73 Deterrence: The Lcr.nl Threat in Crime Control. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Zung, Burton J.
1984 "Correlates of the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST) 
Among DUI Offenders." Journal of Clinical Psvcholor.v 
40(2):607-612.
Zylman, Richard
1972a "Age is More Important Than Alcohol in the Collision-
Involvement of Young and Old Drivers." Journal of Traffic 
Safety Education 20:7-8.
Zylman, Richard
1972b "Race and Social Status Discrimination and Police Action in 
Alcohol-affected Collisions." Journal, of Safety Research 
4:75-84.
